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I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1981-1982 term, the Seventh Circuit confronted a large
number of criminal law cases encompassing both substantive and pro-
cedural issues. Given this wide range of issues, it is imperative for the
practitioner to be familiar with the Seventh Circuit's activities through-
out the broad spectrum of criminal law. Therefore, instead of focusing
on a few major cases, this article is structured to give practitioner and
scholar alike a thorough sense of the Circuit's views on several different
criminal law topics.
If any generalization can be made about the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach during this past term, it is the continued conservative bent of
the Court when confronting issues in criminal law. While by and large
adhering to the principles it has laid down in previous terms, the court
has nevertheless been willing to confront confficts with the other Cir-
cuits and to change as principles and precedents change.
II. PRETRIAL ISSUES
A. Federal grandjury matters
1. False statements
An interesting fact situation which many sporting fans may be
able to identify with occurred in United States v. MartellanoI when an
I. 675 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1982).
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undercover investigation by the Organized Crime Strike Force and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed a bureau agent in a res-
taurant. The agent bet $50 with the maitre d' on the outcome of the
1980 Super Bowl football game. The defendant won the bet and the
undercover agent paid off. No other indications of criminal activity
involving the maitre d' were known to the government. The maitre d'
was called before a special grand jury and the one-count indictment
was based upon the following declaration before the grand jury:
Q. Have you at any time-first of all, during the period you were
employed at Snug's [restaurant], did you ever have occasion to
accept wagers on sporting events?
A. No.
The government charged that these declarations were false and
known by the defendant to be false when made "because on or about
January 8, 1980, he accepted a wager in the amount of $50 on a profes-
sional football game." He was convicted by a jury.
The tenor of the appellate litigation was set by the government
labelling the defendant's defense as merely "lexicological gymnastics."
The Seventh Circuit responded with an outright reversal, saying "If
that characterization applies to anything, it may be to the government's
case."
The defendant was charged with violation of section 1623(a)2
which requires only that the false statement be knowingly made. Pros-
ecution under section 1621 requires a showing of wilfulness. The court
felt that instead of taking the defendant's defense seriously, the govern-
ment tried to "talk it away without evidence." 3 The defense at trial
was, first, that the question on its face was ambiguous because it in-
quires about "wagers" on "sporting events". Since the evidence
presented by the government showed only one bet, appellant therefore
claimed to have answered honestly. Second, the appellant said that he
misunderstood the thrust of the question, and so explained in his trial
testimony.
The defendant's position was that by facing a federal grand jury
probing racketeering and organized crime, appellant did not conceive
that the question could be directed at his one "personal" $50 bet.
Martellano testified that he was misled because of the plural aspects of
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever under oath... in any
proceeding before. . . any. . . grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false mate-
rial declaration. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
3. 675 F.2d at 943.
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the question and because prior questions concerned the use of the tele-
phone at the restaurant. The court on review agreed, stating that per-
jury charges should be based upon precise, rather than vague
questions. 4 The court noted that there was only the one general ques-
tion about the defendant accepting wagers on sporting events. The
common practice of going from general questions to specific questions
to form the predicate for perjury was not followed in this case.5 The
court believed a fair and natural follow-up question before the grand
jury wouldhave been, "You mean you have never even accepted a bet
on the Super Bowl?" A "yes" to that question would have given the
government a solid foundation for its case, but a "no" would have de-
stroyed it. It appears that the government had no other way to proceed
against this defendant than to snag him on the one, ambiguous ques-
tion. The court believed that the one question for which the defendant
was convicted of answering falsely had some of the elements of a trap
unless the witness was sophisticated enough to do a better job of an-
swering the question than the government counsel did in asking it.
In United States v. Raineri,6 the defendant contended that his false
statements before the grand jury were not material to its investigation
and that he did not obstruct justice. The evidence showed that in his
appearance before the grand jury the United States Attorney told him
that he was a target of an investigation involving prostitution. The
prosecutor questioned the defendant concerning his relationship with
an employee of the Showbar, a club he and an employee named Gas-
bard managed.
When asked before the grand jury about a trip he took to a judicial
seminar in Reno, Nevada, the defendant said that he did not travel to
and from Reno with Ms. Gasbarri; that she went there with her brother
and sister. The defendant further advised the grand jury that while in
Reno, Nevada, he either ran into the group by accident or that Gas-
barn and her family looked him up. Raineri said that at the most he
probably spent one day associating with Gasbarri in Reno.
In fact, the evidence showed the defendant had traveled to and
from Reno with Gasbarri and they stayed together for the three weeks,
except for a three or four day period. He paid for Gasbarri's travel
expenses. The court in Raineri said the materiality of a false statement
is an essential element of the crime and is a question of law for the trial
4. Id, citing United States v. Laikin, 583 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1978).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Paolicelli, 505 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1974).
6. 670 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1982).
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court to decide.7
The court had previously defined materiality as a statement's "ef-
fect or tendency to impede, influence or dissuade the grand jury from
pursuing its investigation."' 8 The court said that it believed the rela-
tionship between the defendant, a circuit judge in the state and a for-
mer district attorney, and Ms. Gasbarri, the person ostensibly in charge
of the Showbar, was important to the grand jury's investigation of the
defendant's involvement in the prostitution enterprise. The defend-
ant's false statements had the tendency to impede the grand jury from
discovering the nature and the depth of that relationship.
For those reasons, the court said the defendant's false statements
were material, and any potential interference with a line of inquiry in a
grand jury investigation suffices to establish materiality, regardless of
whether the perjured testimony actually serves to impede the
investigation. 9
In United States v. Picketts,l0 the defendant was charged with en-
gaging in a pattern of racketeering by soliciting and accepting money
from electricians in return for his recommendation that they were qual-
ified to receive full union membership status and with making false
statements to a grand jury. He was successful in securing an acquittal
as to the first count because of a defect in the indictment but was con-
victed of denying to a grand jury that he had solicited and accepted
money. The various arguments on appeal included the defendant's
contentions that no evidence existed of the materiality of the false dec-
larations and that there was no proof of the defendant being sworn
when he appeared before the grand jury.
The court disposed of the argument that the statements were not
made under oath by a review of the grand jury transcript which noted
that the defendant had been sworn, and relied upon United States v.
De VittI for the proposition that the introduction of the grand jury
transcript and the testimony of a Justice Department attorney who had
been present at the grand jury proceedings is sufficient to show that
7. Id at 718, citing United States v. Picketts, 655 F.2d 837, 840 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1056 (1981). See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929).
8. United States v. Picketts, 655 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981);
United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957). See
United States v. Shimpy, 531 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1976) (anything that could influence or
mislead); United States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1975) (relevant to any subsidiary
issue under consideration); United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 380 (8th Cir. 1973) (tending to
influence, mislead, or hamper).
9. 670 F.2d at 718. See United States v. Howard, 560 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1977).
10. 655 F.2d 837 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981).
I1. 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
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testimony was under oath. The court noted that in future cases, it
would be better practice for someone present at the grand jury proceed-
ings to testify to the giving of an oath, thereby proving the necessary
element of the crime--4hat the false statements were made under
oath. 12
The defendant argued that his fifth amendment rights were vio-
lated since the United States Attorney had already presented evidence
to the grand jury which the prosecutor believed was sufficient to merit
his recommendation that the defendant be indicted for illegal acts.
Picketts argued that to call him before the grand jury to be asked if he
committed those acts was improper. The court dismissed this theory,
stating that there is nothing improper about a grand jury calling the
target of its investigation to testify.1 3 The defendant could have prop-
erly invoked his fifth amendment right not to testify, but he chose not
to do so. Once he waived his right against self-incrimination, the de-
fendant was required to testify truthfully or to risk prosecution for not
doing so. The court said that our legal system provides methods for




United States v. Udziela 5 is a case of first impression in the Sev-
enth Circuit. The court exercised its supervisory power and held, pro-
spectively, that where perjured testimony supporting an indictment is
discovered before trial, the government has the option of either volun-
tarily withdrawing the tainted indictment and seeking a new one before
the grand jury when it reconvenes, unless it is already sitting, or of
appearing with defense counsel before the district court for an in cam-
era inspection of the grand jury transcripts for a determination whether
other sufficient evidence exists to support the indictment.' 6 If other,
sufficient evidence is present so that the grand jury may have indicted
without giving any weight to the perjured testimony, the indictment
cannot be challenged on the basis of perjury.
The court explored the historical development of the grand jury
from the ancient English system through modern day developments
12. United States v. Picketts, 655 F.2d at 840.
13. Id at 842, citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 583-84 (1976).
14. Id at 842, citing Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969), quoted in Manduajano,
425 U.S. at 585. Accord, United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
15. 671 F.2d 995 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2964 (1982).
16. Id at 1001.
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which have made the grand jury a constitutional fixture, belonging to
neither the executive nor the judicial branch.' 7 The court recognized
the lofty position that the grand jury has assumed as an instrument of
justice,' 8 but realized that, as a practical matter, the modem grand jury
is greatly dependent on the United States Attorney "to present to it
such evidence as it needs for performance of its function and to furnish
it with controlling legal principles."' 19
Recognizing the increasing dependency on the grand jury system,
federal courts in recent years have become more sensitive to allegations
of governmental misconduct before the grand jury and have demon-
strated greater willingness to curb prosecutorial abuse of such proceed-
ings.20 The court summarized the attitude of the Ninth Circuit 2' that
prosecutorial misconduct must be "flagrant" to violate due process. In
the instant case, the day before trial, after the grand jury was no longer
sitting, the government revealed that a grand jury witness reportedly
had lied. The government, taken by surprise, immediately disclosed
this new information to defense counsel. The case proceeded to trial,
and on direct examination, the witness told a story greatly different
.from his grand jury testimony directly implicating the defendant in
many respects. After three days at trial, the defendant moved to dis-
miss the indictment because he claims it was based, at least in part, on
perjured testimony. The motion was denied. The defendant was con-
victed and the appeal followed. The court did not reverse the convic-
tion in this case since their independent review of the grand jury
transcript obviated the need for a hearing before the district court. The
court held that there was ample evidence, apart from the witness' per-
jured testimony, to support the indictment.
3. Subpeonas duces tecum
In a case involving alleged forgery of United States Treasury
checks, the district court suppressed the handwriting exemplars, finger-
prints, and photographs of three defendants secured by postal inspec-
17. Id at 999. See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n. 54 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re April 1956
Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1956).
18. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 362 (1956).
19. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979).
20. 671 F.2d at 999. See generally Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the
Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. I, 16-19 (1980).
21. United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1980). Accord United States ex
rel. Clauser v. Shadid, 677 F.2d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 1982); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972).
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tors through the use of grand jui-y subpoenas duces tecum. At the time
those items were obtained, each defendant made statements which
were also suppressed. The government appealed, and in United States
v. Santucci,22 the court found that the subpoenas were neither sought
nor obtained from any grand jury, nor had the case been opened before
a grand jury. The postal inspectors suspected the three defendants of
criminality and thereafter obtained from the Assistant United States
Attorney blank grand jury subpoenas duces tecum to be served on the
defendants.
There was no dispute that the grand jury could, by subpoenas du-
ces tecum, require handwriting exemplars, photographs, and finger-
prints.23 Further, there was no controversy that the grand jury could
provide in its subpoena that the witness be given an option to provide
the identification evidence outside the actual presence of the grand
jury.24 The issue in the trial court was whether or not the United States
Attorney's office should be permitted to use evidence gathered by the
use of a grand jury subpoena, not actually authorized by a grand jury,
that also gives the witness an option to satisfy that subpoena outside the
presence of the grand jury.
The trial court viewed the combination of permissible procedures
to be constitutionally impermissible because of the absence of sufficient
involvement by the grand jury. Therefore, all the identification items
as well as the statements of each defendant were suppressed.25
The Seventh Circuit had not ruled on this issue before. Other cir-
cuits had ruled on facets of the problem,26 and the trial court relied
upon these rulings in the search for a fair resolution of the issue, but
the court on review distinguished the cases from the instant fact situa-
tion. 27 The government claimed good faith in all it did, even if what it
did was wrongful. The trial judge found good faith not to be a control-
ling issue, but made his view clear as to the good faith standard which
he would otherwise have applied by contrasting the decisions a United
States Attorney makes in his office with the immediate decisions a po-
lice officer often must make in the street without an opportunity for
22. 674 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 737 (1983).
23. Id at 627, citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1963).
24. Id, citing United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 867 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 871 (1980).
25. Id
26. Id at 628.
27. Id distinguishing In re Melvin, 546 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973); Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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research or reflection.28 The court on appeal agreed that the district
court's comparison crippled the government's good faith argument.
The court, however, reversed and remanded for further proceedings,
saying that the defendants themselves are, in part, responsible for the
absence of grand jury involvement since they elected to provide the
exemplars, fingerprints, and photographs rather than appear before the
grand jury for this purpose. In addition, the government would have
been entitled to secure the identification items by the strict issuance and
use of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, or by other pretrial proce-
dures. To exclude those identification items suppressed by the trial
court would only delay the inevitable for the benefit of no one, but to
the unnecessary detriment of expeditious law enforcement efforts. 29
The dissent in Santucci agreed with the district court's view. The
majority had felt there was no exploitation of the subpoenas and the
statements provided by the defendants sufficiently qualified as the
product of the exercise of free will. However, the majority cautioned
that any "casual handling of subpoenas" by the government only cre-
ates delays and time-consuming legal argument in procedural hearings
and appellate review of the issue.30 The court believed these problems
could easily be avoided by the prosecution since they merely tend to
legitimize the attacks upon the grand jury processes by its critics who
claim the grand jury has "degenerated into an abusive tool of the
United States Attorney.
3'
4. Secrecy vs. Disclosure
In 1977, Congress added an exception 32 to the general rule of se-
crecy of grand jury matters. 33 In re Special February 1975 Grand
Jury,3 4 concerned that exception, which permits disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury, with court approval "preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding." 35 In addition, this case
discussed the district court's "general supervisory powers" which al-
lows, in rare situations, district courts to slip entirely around Rule 6(e)
28. Id at 631, citing United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981).
29. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
30. Santucci, 674 F.2d at 633 n.4.
31. Id
32. FED. R. CaiM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
33. PUB. L. 95-78, §2, 91 STAT. 319.
34. 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 198 1), qff'd United States v. Baggot, - U.S. -, 51 U.S.L.W. 5075
(1983).
35. FED. R. CIuM. P. 6(e).
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and permit disclosure. 36 In the-instant litigation, the government de-
sired disclosure of a taxpayer's admissions of wrongdoing before the
grand jury. In addition, the government sought certain grand jury in-
formation of the taxpayer's net profit for the year 1975, records show-
ing purchase and sales statements, and grand jury testimony
surrounding the grand jury investigation of the taxpayer.
The district court denied the request of the government, reasoning
that the subject-matter either was not activity occurring before the
grand jury, and therefore not subject to Rule 6(e) secrecy limitations,
or, were outside disclosure since the items were not "preliminarily to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding. ' 37 The court acknowledged
that it is not always bound by the strict and literal interpretation of
Rule 6(e) in the situation where there is some extraordinary and com-
pelling need for disclosure in the interest of justice, and little traditional
need for secrecy remains. Inasmuch as the government's request for
disclosure concerned the civil aspects of the taxpayer's grand jury in-
vestigation, the court agreed that tax collection is important, but of in-
sufficient priority to justify revealing grand jury matters. The
alternative available to the IRS is sufficient, namely the statutory
means38 to accomplish its present efforts at assessing civil liability.
The court refused to allow liberal disclosure of grand jury matters
for IRS tax collection efforts, which would perhaps facilitate tax collec-
tion, at the expense of creating a temptation to abuse the grand jury
process. The court ruled that documents subpeonaed by the IRS are
subject to Rule 6(e) and if the documents reveal grand jury secrets then
the documents acquire immunity and need not be revealed. 39 Any
third-party documents which do not breach grand jury secrecy may be
released under the district court's supervisory power. The trial judge
who is thoroughly familiar with the grand jury proceeding will be ac-
corded wide discretion in making these determinations. 4°
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit approach differs from the
rule in other circuits. It was the court's belief that some courts have
gone a degree further than the Seventh Circuit found necessary in the
instant case, and have held that "matters occurring before the grand
jury" include documents that may tend to reveal what transpired
36. Id; In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2nd Cir. 1973).
37. 662 F.2d at 1235.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976); See United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45,
50 (10th Cir. 1974).
39. 662 F.2d at 1244.
40. Id at 1243.
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before the grand jury.4' Under that test, the documents in the instant
litigation would "unquestionably be protected from disclosure.
42
The case of In re State of Illinois Petition to Inspect and Copy
Grand Jury Materials,43 raised the question of whether a provision of
the Antitrust Improvements Act" authorizes the disclosure of grand
jury materials to a state attorney general without the traditional show-
ing of particularized need.45 The government did not oppose providing
the grand jury materials but certain defendants, in the civil suits related
to the grand jury inquiries, and others intervened to oppose the request
of the State of Illinois.
The district court denied Illinois access to any of the requested
grand jury materials, stating that the "investigative files and other
materials" language of the Act did not refer to material acquired by
and belonging to the grand jury.46 The district court concluded that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 47 determine the conditions under
which disclosure of grand jury materials is permissible. The district
judge denied disclosure of the grand jury materials because he found
that the petitioners had failed to meet the particularized need standard
required by Rule 6(e).
The Seventh Circuit declined to follow the thinking of the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits, which have held that the provisions of the Antitrust
Improvements Act were intended to include grand jury materials.48 In-
stead, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the law does not permit the De-
partment of Justice to release grand jury materials to a state attorney
general "upon request" as was urged by the State of Illinois' interpreta-
tion of the law. The court said the governing law as to the disclosure of
grand jury minutes is Rule 6(e), 49 and requires a showing of "particu-
larized need."50
41. Id See United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp. 784, 790 (S.D. Mo. 1978);
accord, In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202, 216 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (N.D. I11. 1979). See also United States v. Hughes, 429 F.2d 1293,
1294 (10th Cir. 1970); U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18, 20-21 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
42. In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d at 1244.
43. 659 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1981), aft'd, Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., Inc., - U.S. -, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65290 (1983).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
45. 659 F.2d at 801.
46. 659 F.2d at 802.
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
48. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. deniedsub.
nom. Certain Unindicted Individuals and Corporations v. United States, 450 U.S. 913 (1981);
United States v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
49. 659 F.2d at 804.
50. Id at 804, 808.
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A recalcitrant grand jury witness was adjudged by the district
court to be in civil contempt and was ordered confined. 5' In the appeal
of this order, the court in In re DeMonte52 was asked to consider al-
lowing a change in the Seventh Circuit rule established in Matter of
Special February 1977 Grand Jury (Pavone) 53 which denied "full dis-
covery" when a grant of immunity is offered54 to a witness before the
grand jury and the witness asserts that the inquiry, which he alleged
was based on illegal electronic surveillance, was unlawful under federal
law.
55
In DeMonte, the defendant appeared before a special grand jury
and asserted his fifth amendment privilege. Following that refusal to
testify, the government presented to the district court a petition for an
order granting the defendant immunity. At the hearing on the immu-
nity petition, the defendant restated his claim that he had been the sub-
ject of illegal electronic surveillance and asked for limited access to
government documents which purportedly authorized such
surveillance.
The trial court had disallowed that argument as premature and
granted the immunity order.56 The defendant was returned to the
grand jury, and for the third time he refused to testify. Despite the
grant of immunity, he continued to assert what he claimed was his fifth
amendment privilege. He also repeated his claim that his subpoena
was "based on illegal wire tapping." The government responded by
filing a petition for contempt.
At the hearing in the district court the contempt order was entered.
At this hearing, the government responded to the defendant's prior
wiretap allegations by presenting an affidavit which admitted that the
defendant had been the subject of electronic surveillance, but which
stated that all electronic interceptions of defendant's communications
had been lawful. The government filed a set of sealed documents in
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
52. 667 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1981).
53. 570 F.2d 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nonL Pavone v. United States, 437 U.S. 904
(1978). The court evaluated the discovery request of a recalcitrant grand jury witness in a factual
setting similar to the case at bar.
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1976); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454 (1972).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceedings in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that infor-
mation would be in violation of this Chapter.
56. 667 F.2d at 592.
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support of this contention. The defendant moved for permission to ex-
amine the supporting materials. The trial court had denied the request
and, instead, made an in camera review of the documents. The issue
presented on review was whether the district court erred in denying the
appellant limited access to documents presented by the government to
support its claim that the electronic surveillance of the appellant was
lawful. The district court had relied upon Pavone.57 The reviewing
court noted that two other circuits,58 faced specifically with "limited
access" requests, had followed the lead of the First Circuit.59 These
circuits spoke of the need to balance three interests: effective grand
jury investigation, government secrecy, and a grand jury witness' right
not to answer questions based upon illegal surveillance. The cases em-
phasized that, in this sensitive area, the "limitation" as well as the "ac-
cess" are crucial to this balance.60
The Seventh Circuit, in evaluating the context of this continuum,
and in light of the appellant's limited request, held that the better rule
would be to presumptively permit him some access. The court said
such a rule will not undermine the policy considerations noted in
Pavone. The delay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably
increased. Any secrecy concerns will be protected by the government's
ability to rebut the presumption of limited access. Should the govern-
ment object, the trial court's preliminary determination regarding the
effect of the presumption will itself be made in camera.
The court was convinced the new Seventh Circuit rule reflects a
recognition of the countervailing individual interest at stake. In addi-
tion, the rule will help to refine the exercise of judicial discretion which
is so vital in this area. By utilizing a presumption of limited disclosure,
but allowing the government to rebut that presumption, a court will be
better able to focus on the pivotal questions of an individual case.
The court set forth additional tips, stating that when total nondis-
closure is truly important, the government will indicate specific reasons
why the trial judge should preclude access. On the other hand, in a
case where there is an irregularity which is not patent, a witness may be
able to explain why the court, in its discretion, should disclose addi-
tional information. In adopting the "limited access" rule outlined by
57. 570 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
58. In re Harkins, 624 F.2d 1160, 1166 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Kat-
souros), 613 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
59. 667 F.2d at 599. See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (Ist Cir. 1974).
60. 667 F.2d at 599.
532
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the First Circuit,6 ' the court in DeMonte vacated the district court or-
der holding the defendant in contempt, since he was not given such
access, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
5. Use Immunity's Effect on Later Civil Deposition
In the district court, defendant Conboy had been ordered to an-
swer questions at a deposition concerning a civil antitrust action. The
questions were either taken verbatim from or closely tracking the tran-
scripts of his previous grand jury testimony, for which he had earlier
received use immunity.62 Conboy asserted his fifth amendment privi-
lege. The district judge63 held him in contempt of court and the appeal
followed. The reviewing court, relying upon the Second and Eighth
Circuit case law, 64 affirmed the order of the district court ordering ap-
pellant to answer deposition questions. In re Corrugated Container An-
titrust Litigation (Conboy)65 held that terms of the use immunity statute
prohibit the use of Conboy's immunized grand jury testimony or any
information "directly or indirectly derived from" it, in any criminal
case except a perjury prosecution.66 Since the questions being asked in
the deposition phase of the case were taken verbatim from or closely
tracked the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, the court did
not believe that any of Conboy's answers at the deposition would be
"derived from" the prior immunized grand jury testimony and there-
fore unavailable for use in any subsequent criminal prosecution. The
court believed Conboy's contention of possible criminal prosecution
was not sufficient to invoke his fifth amendment privilege.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve the
conflict in the Courts of Appeals, and affirmed in Pillsbury Co. v. Con-
boy.67 The Court said that "Conboy acted properly in maintaining his
silence in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by test-
ing the validity of his privilege on appeal."'68 The Court held that a
deponent's civil deposition testimony, closely tracking his prior immu-
61. 667 F.2d at 598-99 n.20, 22-25. See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 6001 (1976).
63. The Chief Judge of the District Court for the Southern District of Texas expressly exer-
cised the powers of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(b). The contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in Houston.
64. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1980); Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979).
65. 655 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1981).
66. 655 F.2d at 751. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
449 (1972).
67. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983).
68. Id - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 617.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
nized testimony, is not, without duly authorized assurance of immunity
at the time, immunized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and




The court set forth the test for determining the sufficiency of an
indictment in United States v. Garcia-Geronimo .70 The fifth amendment
guarantee of the right to indictment by a grand jury and its bar to
double jeopardy, and the sixth amendment guarantee that the defend-
ant be informed of the charge against him require that for an indict-
ment to be valid it must contain the elements of the offense. In
addition, it must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet. If any other proceedings are taken against the de-
fendant for a similar offense, the record must show with accuracy to
what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction. The indict-
ment, the court said, must also show sufficient facts being alleged in the
charge so that the court may decide whether such facts are sufficient in
law to support a conviction. 7' The court said the test for determining
the sufficiency of the indictment is whether the indictment sets forth the
elements of the offense charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant
of the charges to enable him to prepare for trial.
72
C. The Competency of/the Defendant
The undesirable practice of lawyers engaging in unsworn colloquy
with the judiciary over matters concerning substantial rights of their
clients and former clients was highlighted in Stokes v. United States."
The court had earlier decided an appeal in Stokes and remanded to the
district court.74 The issue in the present appeal concerned the propriety
of a hearing conducted by the trial court during defendant's motion to
vacate sentence. Stokes claimed he was incompetent to stand trial, an
issue not raised by his trial counsel. The court on appeal said that once
69. Id
70. 663 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1981).
71. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); Hagner v. United States, 385 U.S.
427 (1932); United States v. Clark, 649 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d
178, 180 (7th Cir. 1979).
72. 663 F.2d at 743; accord, United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1112-13 (7th Cir. 1976),
a'd inpart, vacated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); People v. Harvey, 53 IU.2d 585,
294 N.E.2d 269 (1973).
73. 652 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1981).
74. Stokes v. United States, No. 79-1286 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1979) (unpublished order).
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a factual dispute has developed concerning the issue of incompetency,
an adversary hearing must be held, with counsel.75 The district court
had engaged in an unsworn colloquy with Stokes' trial counsel, who
did not represent him for the section 225576 motion, to determine why
counsel did not raise the competency issue. In his written memoran-
dum, the district judge stated that he relied on "an extensive interview
of the defendant's trial counsel" who "unequivocally thought his client
to be competent." In an oral ruling, the district judge included the ob-
servation that he was "very impressed" with counsel's remark that "he
did not feel that there was the slightest chance that there was an incom-
petency issue to be raised, so he didn't raise it." Stokes was not repre-
sented by counsel at the section 2255 hearing, nor was he allowed to
cross examine his former counsel.
On appeal, the court felt this exparte hearing did not satisfy Sec-
tion 2255's requirement of an adversary judicial hearing. The court
relied upon United States v. Underwood.77 In Underwood, the trial
judge held an in-chambers conference with the prosecutor and Under-
wood's trial counsel. The First Circuit's appraisal in Underwood was
that the unsworn representations of counsel are not a substitute for evi-
dence. The court reversed and remanded the instant case for an evi-
dentiary hearing, instructing that counsel be provided to Stokes. The
court noted that since the district court had refused to appoint an in-
dependent psychiatrist to examine Stokes previously, and while this
alone would not constitute an abuse of discretion, the court felt in the
"interest of finality" the trial court may wish to "reconsider its deci-
sion." Perhaps this directive was designed to encourage district courts
from prolonging litigation in cases involving incompetency issues,
which could otherwise be handled with reasonable dispatch in the trial
court without the certain intervention of appellate review.
D. Motion to Suppress
1. Court's Right to Reconsider
In United States v. Regilio,78 the court was faced with a question of
first impression in this circuit as to whether or not it is permissible for a
district court to admit evidence at a second trial which it had sup-
pressed at the first trial. The only other decision on this issue was the
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
76. Id
77. 577 F.2d 157 (ist Cir. 1978).
78. 669 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2959 (1982).
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Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Harris .79
The Harris court held that it was not error for the district court to
reconsider its pretrial suppression order after a mistrial and to reverse
the original order. The Regifio court followed Harris and held that
Regilio builds upon United States v. Jones,80 in which the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that if a district court denies a pretrial motion to suppress, and
matters appearing at trial cast doubt on the pretrial ruling, the district
court must reconsider the issue of suppression de novo. The court in
Jones ruled that the defendant was entitled to have evidence sup-
pressed only if it was obtained unconstitutionally. The Regiio court
said if it later appears that no constitutional violation occurred, soci-
ety's interest in admitting all relevant evidence militates strongly in
favor of permitting reconsideration of an earlier motion to suppress
decision.
8'
2. Warrantless Entry of the Home
In United States v. White,8 2 the defendants were convicted of pos-
session of heroin with intent to distribute. On appeal, the defendant
argued the infirmity of the search processes and the seizure of
$42,194.00. The district court had granted a Rule 41(e) 83 motion based
upon the unconstitutionality of the seizure. The government returned
the money in compliance with the ruling and then immediately
reseized the money and brought a civil forfeiture action.
8 4
The district court granted summary judgment for White in the for-
feiture action because of the collateral estoppel effect of its earlier de-
termination that the money had been illegally seized.8 5 The motion
was granted because the seized money was unrelated to the indictment
in the instant case for possession of heroin. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, distinguishing the defendant's reliance on United States v. One
Residence and Attached Garage (4ccardo).86 In Accardo, the authori-
ties seized a large sum of money found in the home of a suspected
79. 479 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1973).
80. 438 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1971).
81. Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1177, citing, United States v. Covello, 657 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1981);
United States v. White, 607 F.2d 203, 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1114 (1980).
82. 660 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides in part, that "a person aggrieved by an unlawful...
seizure may move the district court .. for the return of the property .. .which was illegally
seized".
84. United States v. $38,394 U.S. Currency, 498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see 21 U.S.C.
§ 88 1(a)(6) (1976).
85. 498 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
86. 603 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1979).
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underworld figure despite the absence of evidence linking the money to
any specific criminal acts. In White, the court found United States v.
Jones87 controlling. In Jones, officers during a valid search found a
substantial quantity of cash in large bills, even though the actual identi-
fication of the pre-recorded funds did not occur until later. In the in-
stant case the court noted that $3,800 in pre-recorded funds
representing five previous heroin sales was identified among the
$42,194 seized from White's apartment. In addition, the officers knew
that at least one previous narcotics transaction had taken place in
White's apartment where the money was found. The court reversed the
district court's determination and held that the seizure was lawful, va-
cated the judgment for White in the civil forfeiture action, affirmed the
heroin conviction and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
88
Moreover, White attempted to show the entry into his home was
violative of Payton v. New York,89 since his consent was obtained by
deceit. The district court found the warrant requirement mandated in
Payton inapplicable because the officers entered White's apartment
with White's consent. White's argument was that allowing consent by
deceit after probable cause sufficient to get an arrest warrant has arisen
vitiates Payton's arrest warrant requirement. The court agreed it would
have been more receptive to White's theory if the entry into his home
had been solely to effect his arrest. The court noted the deceitfully
obtained consent in this case was part of an ongoing investigation into
White's heroin activities. The court ruled, "[w]e do not believe that an
arrest warrant need be obtained as soon as probable cause attaches." 90
The court found that since the entry into White's apartment served in-
vestigative purposes, the entry was permissible even though White's
consent was obtained by a ruse. 91 In affirming White's conviction the
court rejected the argument that the requirement of an arrest warrant
in the instant case would add to the protection accorded by Payton.
The court said that the warrant requirements interpose the decision of a
neutral and detached magistrate to protect individuals from unfounded
87. 518 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 997 (1975) ("when police found a
substantial quantity of cash in large bills, they could reasonably believe that this was the fruit of
criminal behavior, even though the actual identification of the pre-recorded funds did not occur
until later".
88. 660 F.2d at 1185.
89. 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) ("the Fourth Amendment ... prohibits the police from making
a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony
arrest").
90. 660 F.2d at 1183.
91. Id, citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209-11 (1966).
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invasions of their privacy by preventing unwarranted intrusions. 92
The court reasoned that a magistrate's determination that prob-
able cause for an arrest warrant was lacking, if such a determination
had been made, would not have prevented the ultimate intrusion in the
present case. The undercover officers would still have been admitted to
White's home by posing as heroin purchasers, an entry condoned by
the Supreme Court in Lewis v. United States,9 3 and the officers would
have arrested White when they discovered the heroin. The court said it
serves no purpose to require an arrest warrant where the same intrusion
would occur whether or not the magistrate issued the warrant.
94
In United States v. Gillespie,95 the court considered a novel issue
concerning the applicability of arrest warrants in searches. The court
concluded the factual issue was the same as that confronted in Steagald
v. United States,96 which held that the possession of an arrest warrant
by law enforcement officers for a third party does not justify the search
of a home not belonging to the person named in the arrest warrant. In
light of Steagald, the court reversed outright the defendant's conviction
for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. The court reasoned
that the circumstances surrounding the police and the FBI agents entry
into the defendant's home indicated that consent could not have been
freely and voluntarily given since law enforcement officers arrived with
shotguns and revolvers drawn positioning themselves at the defend-
ant's front and back doors. When the defendant opened the door he
was told by the law enforcement officers they were making efforts to
locate three fugitives. The court's opinion described how the facts
showed the law enforcement officers had their weapons drawn in the
"ready" position as the officers frisked the defendant, forced him to
walk in front of them with their shotguns cocked, and searched through
the house, room by room. The court remarked that "essentially free
and unrestrained choice" is not possible under such circumstances.
97
The prosecution argued that the conviction should be affirmed inas-
much as a second and third search of the defendant's home, made with
the defendant's consent, also yielded additional heroin charged in this
case. The court maintained that all the police knowledge of the de-
fendant's illegal activities was derived from their initial unconstitu-
92. 660 F.2d at 1183.
93. 385 U.S. 206, 210-11.
94. 660 F.2d at 1183.
95. 650 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1981).
96. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
97. 650 F.2d at 129.
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tional search; therefore, none of the physical evidence against the
defendant discovered on the day of the search may be introduced
against him.98 The prosecution also argued that the testimonial evi-
dence obtained suffered from the same taint as the physical evidence,
because the exclusionary sanction applies to any "fruits" of a constitu-
tional violation-whether the fruits consists of tangible evidence, con-
fessions, or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest
and detention.99
The court said that since the "probable cause" for the defendant's
arrest, during which period of time he made the confession, had re-
sulted directly from the evidence seized during the illegal search, his
detention was also illegal. Therefore, the court concluded, the testimo-
nial evidence obtained from the defendant by law enforcement authori-
ties, although voluntary under the fifth amendment standards, was
inadmissible under the fourth amendment. 00
In United States v. Fleming,10' the defendants were tried jointly on
federal drug charges and, after a bench trial, convicted. Fleming in-
volved the warrantless entry into a home and the warrantless arrests of
the appellants following the continuous seventy-day surveillance of
Fleming and his acquaintances. DEA agents observed each of the ap-
pellants greet one another at the doorway of Fleming's home in what
they believed might be a narcotics transaction. Once when the door
was ajar, the law enforcement agent saw Fleming with a small paper
bag in his hand. The agent arrested the arriving guest. In addition, the
agent put his foot in the doorway, preventing Fleming from shutting
the door. Two other officers who had been assigned to the stake-out
went in through the door and arrested Fleming. Fleming's version of
the events was substantially different, saying he was carrying nothing
when he came to the door, and the police pushed past him, over his
protest, explaining only that they needed to "secure the premises." 0 2
The district court and the reviewing court approved the warrant-
less entry, holding that probable cause was established when the law
enforcement agent had enough evidence to lead him to believe that
defendants had committed or were committing a criminal act.10 3
98. Id, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
99. Gillespie, 650 F.2d at 129, citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
100. 650 F.2d at 129-30, citing Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 218 (1979); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
101. 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1982).
102. Id at 605 n.6.
103. See United States v. Gaston, 620 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1980).
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The appellants also argued in Fleming that inasmuch as the police
had so much evidence of Fleming's possible involvement in drug traf-
ficking, they should have obtained an arrest warrant for him and a
search warrant for his home since no exigent circumstances existed to
bypass the requirements of Payton v. New York.' 0 4 The district court
found this action by the law enforcement agents was not a routine fel-
ony arrest, but an entry into the appellant's home only after they saw
him standing with his front door ajar, engaging in what could reason-
ably be believed to be a drug sale. The court found that the police
conduct of following Fleming into the house was governed, not by Pay-
ton, but by United States v. Santana. 105 The court affirmed the convic-
tions in Fleming, saying there was no constitutional defect in what the
authorities did preliminarily to the arrest of the defendants. The court
said it would not second-guess the officers' investigative strategy of
foregoing the obtaining of a search and arrest warrant and continuing
their stake-out in the hopes of catching Fleming and one of his custom-
ers "redhanded."
3. Administrative Searches and Warrants
In Nechy v. United States,'0 6 the court had occasion to adopt the
interpretation of other circuits when it considered the provisions of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.107 In
1980, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sought and ob-
tained a search warrant 08 which authorized the agency to conduct an
administrative inspection search of a pharmacy in Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin. The issue of the legality of the search was tested by the pharmacy
by filing a motion in the district court pursuant to Rule 41(e) 10 9 for the
return of the seized property. The pharmacy requested an evidentiary
hearing. The district court ruled that there was probable cause, as de-
fined by Title 21,110 to support the issuance of the warrant. Accord-
ingly, the court refused the pharmacy's request for an evidentiary
104. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest).
105. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, the drug sale had been completed and the seller was
standing in the doorway of her house, paper bag in hand, when the police announced themselves
and moved to arrest her. She retreated inside. The court held that Santana was in a public place
when the police sought to arrest her, and that a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been
set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping to a private place.
106. 665 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1981).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d) (1976).
109. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 880(d) (1976).
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hearing, and denied the motion for suppression and return of the seized
materials.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that "it is well-established
that Congress may authorize searches of regulated industries conducted
under authority of warrants issued on less than probable cause.""' I l
The court said the issue has never been before the Seventh Circuit, but
that those courts of appeals which have addressed the matter have held
that there is probable cause to issue a warrant if the warrant affidavit
alleges either that the regulated pharmacy has never previously been
inspected, 11 2 or that the pharmacy has recently purchased a large
amount of a controlled drug."13 The court agreed with these opinions
and held that a warrant affidavit averring either that a pharmacy has
never been inspected, or that it has recently received an inordinately
large supply of a controlled drug, is sufficient to establish probable
cause to issue an administrative search warrant. No hearing was neces-
sary to determine whether the warrant in this case was issued upon a
showing of probable cause since the pharmacy admitted the warrant
affidavit stated administrative probable cause.
In a concurring opinion, the possible limits on the use of these
administrative warrants was explored. The opinion noted that since
the DEA in this case used the Milwaukee police in the search of the
pharmacy, it was questionable that the real purpose behind the issu-
ance and use of the administrative warrant was to gather evidence of
criminal activity. The concurring opinion said that employing admin-
istrative warrants for criminal investigations is illegal. 114 The concur-
ring opinion agreed that under the present circumstances there was no
basis for an evidentiary hearing. However, should a criminal proceed-
ing result from the search, the concurring opinion noted the appellant
could then raise his objection about the improper use of the administra-
tive warrant.' 15
4. Warrant for "Beeper" and Home Entry
In United States v. Ellery, 116 the defendant was convicted of drug-
related crimes, and on appeal attacked the government's use of an elec-
111. 665 F.2d at 777, citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) and Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).
112. Id citing United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1976).
113. Id, citing United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1978).
114. 665 F.2d at 777 (Swygert, J., concurring).
115. Id at 777-78.
116. 678 F.2d 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 150 (1982).
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tronic beeper, a tracking device, which led agents to his apartment, and
ultimately, to discovery of his clandestine drug laboratory. The court
approved this investigative technique in Ellery, where the government
alleged that a high risk of detection existed if normal surveillance pro-
cedures were employed. The basis for obtaining the warrant was infor-
mation provided by a chemical company that a shipment of
norephedrine hydrochloride (HCL) was requested for shipment to Chi-
cago and that HCL had no common household use, but is an important
ingredient in the manufacture of the controlled substance ampheta-
mine. The first warrant was authorized and the United Parcel Service
delivery was monitored. Eventually, the package was traced to a par-
ticular apartment unit by using the beeper device.
Another warrant was obtained for entry into the apartment. The
second warrant outlined the occupant's prior history of purchases of
other chemicals used for the manufacturing of controlled substances
and a conviction for possession of marijuana. The seizure included
chemicals used in controlled drugs in addition to equipment used to
produce the drugs. Ellery argued that neither the search warrant for
his apartment nor the order authorizing installation of the beeper were
supported by probable cause. In affirming the conviction, the court
relied upon United States v. 4nton," 7 which contained a number of
factors present in the instant litigation, including the use of a fictitious
name in ordering the chemicals which could be used to produce con-
trolled substance and sworn DEA statements that no legitimate com-
mercial or industrial activity appeared to be occurring at the subject's
home.
In Ellery, the appellant claimed that the items seized from his
home were not in violation of law but were simply unused medication
prescribed by his doctor. The court disposed of this argument by show-
ing that the evidence at trial resulted in appellant admitting he pos-
sessed more tablets than his doctor had prescribed and the
government's proof suggested that appellant was "nearer to a wholesale
supplier of drug store chains than to a mere chemist tinkering with his
toys." ' 18
5. Unreasonable Car Search
In United States v. Posey,'1 9 the court stated that evidence ob-
117. 633 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981).
118. 678 F.2d at 679.
119. 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1982).
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tained by the police was the product of an illegal search and seizure,
but split on the issue of whether it was harmless error. The facts
showed that Posey, while driving his wife's vehicle in the State of Ala-
bama, was observed by a police officer who characterized Posey and
the occupants of the vehicle as persons who were observing the officer
and a banking establishment in a "suspicious manner." The police of-
ficer broadcast a radio message to all law enforcement officers in the
county-wide area instructing anyone seeing the vehicle to "check out
the passengers and see what they were up to." Fifteen minutes later,
and fifteen miles from the small town bank, Posey was stopped. The
police searched Posey's vehicle and a gun was recovered, which the
district court allowed to be introduced into evidence as related to a
bank robbery in the State of Indiana.
The government argued Posey had no standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle owned by his wife. The court disposed of this
argument by noting that whether an individual's fourth amendment
rights are implicated by a government search or seizure turns upon the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy, rather than principles of
property law. 120 Posey plainly had an expectation of privacy in an au-
tomobile owned by his wife and over which he was exercising exclusive
control pursuant to her permission at the time of the search. Therefore,
the search and seizure challenged by Posey implicated his fourth
amendment rights. The government further argued that the stop of
Posey was justified under the probable cause exception carved out by
Terry v. Ohio121 and its progeny.' 22 The court disagreed. The police
officer's suspicions that Posey was preparing to rob a bank in the small
town would be the justification for a Terry stop near the scene of the
bank. However, once Posey was fifteen miles outside the town where
the bank was located, the court did not believe that legal justification
existed for the police to stop and search Posey's vehicle.
The court concluded that the stop of Posey was violative of his
fourth amendment rights and that the subsequent introduction of the
seized revolver in a bank robbery charge in another state was constitu-
tional error, but did not contribute to Posey's conviction.
23
120. Id at 41, citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) and Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978).
121. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
122. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
123. 663 F.2d at 42, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The dissenters saw
matters differently, believing that the handgun, the only piece of physical evidence introduced at
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E Plea Agreements
In United States v. Cook, 124 the district court denied a motion to
vacate a guilty plea. The defendant raised the issue of whether the
government breached its promise to offer nothing in aggravation of the
defendant's sentence by allowing information in its possession to be
included in the probation officer's pre-sentence report to the court. The
probation officer who prepared the report conceded at the hearing that
this information had come primarily from the government's file. The
defendant was charged with five counts centering around narcotics vio-
lations and originally pleaded not guilty to all of the charges. He later
entered anAlford125 plea to one count of distributing cocaine, pursuant
to a plea agreement with the prosecutor.
Unknown to the defendant, the government's file noted that the
defendant was the owner of a lounge reputed to be a major distribution
center for cocaine and marijuana. Furthermore, the defendant was re-
portedly the head of the organization which was distributing those
drugs. The court on review concluded that whether the sentencing
judge became aware of the damaging information through the proba-
tion officer's written report or via the United States Attorney's oral
comments, the result was the same. The government accomplished in-
directly what it had promised not to do directly.
The court held that the government breached its promise to the
defendant that it would offer nothing in aggravation of his sentence
when it permitted the probation officer assigned to the case to obtain
information of an aggravating nature from the government's file for use
in the pre-sentence report to the trial court. Plea agreements, the court
stressed, need to be carefully drawn and understood by all parties to
avoid the problem illustrated in Cook. Since the defendant requested
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, and considering the nature of
the plea agreement, specific performance, even before a different sen-
tencing judge, would seem neither practical nor desirable. The court
decided that allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea would be the
only appropriate remedy.
trial, not only contributed to the conviction, but that without the gun as evidence, the jury would
not have convicted Posey. 663 F.2d at 42.
124. 668 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1982).
125. An A/ford plea is one in which a defendant maintains his innocence but nevertheless
decides to waive his right to a trial and accept a sentence in the belief that he would be found
guilty anyway. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The Department of Justice
regards such pleas as "particularly undesirable when entered as part of an agreement with the
government." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES Of FEDERAL PROSECUTION
30 (1980).
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Santobello v. New York126 held that while a defendant has no ab-
solute right to have a guilty plea accepted, a court must exercise sound
discretion in determining whether or not to reject a plea. In United
States v. Delegal, 27 court-appointed counsel and the government
reached a plea agreement, which was tendered to the district court. Its
substantive terms were simple:
(a) The defendant will plead guilty to count one of the indictment.
(b) The United States will dismiss count two of the indictment at
the time of sentencing.
(c) The United States will remain silent at the time of sentencing.
In addition, the agreement stated that "no promises have been
made to the defendant other than those contained in this petition." In
accordance with Rule 11,128 the district court determined that (1) the
defendant fully understood the plea and had made it voluntarily and
(2) there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Accordingly, the
district court accepted the plea as to count one and set the matter for
sentencing. Several days later, defendant's counsel wrote to the prose-
cutor about the possibility of defendant serving federal time concur-
rently with time due under a prior state court conviction in Florida.
The prosecutor wrote a letter to defendant's counsel advising him he
assumed the defendant believed that his transfer to a state prison sys-
tem in the State of Florida would be a condition to the defendant's plea
of guilty. On that assumption, the government then requested a further
hearing on the defendant's plea agreement. Prior to the hearing, coun-
sel provided the prosecutor with a letter saying that the defendant did
not consider the transfer to the state prison system as a part of the ear-
lier plea agreement.
At the hearing the district court asked the defendant three times
whether he thought any promise concerning the serving of time in the
State of Florida was a part of the plea agreement. The defendant
stated that he was hoping that he would serve his time in Florida, but
that he thought it was essentially the district court's judgment. The
court vacated the guilty plea, and reset the case for trial. The court told
both sides that the understandings expressed at the hearing would serve
as the basis for a revised plea agreement, incorporating a reference to
the possible serving of time in Florida, but making plain that this was
not a condition of the plea.
The defendant's case was then transferred to another district judge
126. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1972).
127. 678 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1982).
128. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1.
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who was unaware of what had transpired at the Rule 11 proceedings.
Defendant's counsel failed to pursue the recasting of the written plea
agreement. The defendant was tried and convicted on counts one and
two. On appeal, he urged that the first district judge improperly or-
dered his guilty plea withdrawn.
The court in Delegal ruled that the defendant was prejudiced by
the withdrawal of the plea agreement, since he was eventually con-
victed on two counts, while he had only entered a plea of guilty to one,
with the government committed to move for the dismissal of the other
count. This case should resolve for many individuals whether or not
Rule 11 requires the need for a written plea agreement. Rule 11 (e)
speaks of a "plea agreement."' 29 The court noted that they did not
mean to imply that plea agreements should not ordinarily be reduced
to written form. The court said that a written agreement eliminates the
confusion which may result from the reviewing of a transcript of an
oral hearing. In addition, the opportunity to consider substantive terms
as they look on paper, in the studied environment of a pre-hearing con-
ference between the defendant and counsel, is preferable to an attempt
to evaluate newly negotiated terms in the context of a court appear-
ance. The court said that if the parties have clearly reached an agree-
ment, a plea should not be rejected simply because it is reflected in a
transcript rather than a writing. The conviction was reversed and re-
manded to the district court with instructions to accept the defendant's
written plea agreement, as supplemented by the subsequent Rule 1 1
hearing. In addition, the defendant was to be sentenced only on count
one and the district court was ordered to act on the government's mo-
tion for dismissal of count two.
In United States v. Lyons, 30 the appellant in a bid rigging prosecu-
tion alleged that evidence used against him was obtained as a result of
leads received from his statement made during immunity negotiations.
Ultimately, the prosecutor declined to seek a grant of immunity for
appellant, feeling that he had not been candid during the discussion.
The court agreed that any agreement made by the government must be
scrupulously performed.13' No express promise was made that deriva-
tive testimony would not be used against Lyons.
The government's recollection was that a proffer from the prospec-
tive candidate for immunity would indicate what the testimony would
129. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e).
130. 670 F.2d 77 (1982).
131. Id at 80, citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
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contain, so that the government would be able to determine the value
of such testimony and whether it was worth obtaining at the price of
immunity. In holding the hearing, the trial court heard testimony of
government attorneys and defense attorneys who had different recollec-
tions of the terms of the immunity session.
The government attorneys said that the chief prosecutor from the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department made his standard speech
regarding the "proffer policy." The usual explanation at the outset of a
proffer conference was that the conference would be off the record in
the sense that nothing the defendant said could be attributed to him or
used against him, but that the government would be free to follow any
leads provided by appellant against him. The defendant's attorneys
did not remember any statement that derivative use would be permit-
ted. Accordingly, in reliance on past practice in the local United States
Attorney's Office, Lyons' attorneys assumed that derivative use was ex-
cluded. On the basis of the testimony of government counsel that the
terms of the immunity conferences were adequately spelled out, and
that no violation of the agreement occurred, the court affirmed Lyons'
conviction.
It appears imperative, in light of Lyons, that lawyers who are in-
volved in immunity negotiations in the future recognize that there may
be derivative use. The terms of immunity conferences in which poten-
tially incriminatory information is given by a person subject to investi-
gation should be spelled out with particular clarity. In this fashion,
counsel for the defendant can ensure that the prosecutorial promises
and agreements will be kept.' 32
III. TRIAL ISSUES
A. Defenses
In United States v. Garza, 133 the appellants were convicted of un-
lawful escape from a federal prison. They defended on the grounds of
duress or necessity. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on their
duress defense. The appellants claimed that the court erroneously re-
placed their duress instruction with a coercion instruction. On review,
the court said that in order for Garza to make out a duress defense,
United States v. Bailey134 would have required appellants to show:
132. See Santobello, 404 U.S. 257.
133. 664 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982).
134. 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980) (the Garza trial occurred before the Supreme Court decision
in Bailey).
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(1) that "an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury
• . . caused [appellants] to engage in conduct violating the literal terms
of the criminal law;" (2) that no reasonable, legal alternative to violat-
ing the law existed; and (3) that appellants made "a bona fide effort to
surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or neces-
sity had lost its coercive force."'
13 5
Since Garza fired shots at the police following his escape effort, the
court said there was no evidence to show any desire to report to author-
ities once safely beyond the prison walls. Therefore, the district court's
instruction, given before the Supreme Court decided Bailey, only re-
quired appellants to show that their escape was necessitated by a rea-
sonable fear of present, immediate, serious harm or death if they
remained in prison; it did not require any consideration of appellant's
intent to return. The court said that since the showing under the dis-
trict court's instruction required less proof than that required by Bailey,
the jury instruction on coercion favored appellants.
The defendants at trial desired to introduce the defense of duress
or necessity to the charge of conveying into any Federal prison "or
from place to place therein, any firearm, weapon. . . or thing designed
to kill, injure, or disable any officer, agent, employee, or inmate
thereof."'' 36 United States v. Mauchlin 137 raised the question of whether
the conveyance of weapons used as part of an escape from a federal
prison could be justified by a fear that one's life would be in danger by
continued confinement in the prison. The court ruled in Mauchlin that
the appellants were not charged with escape, but rather with the con-
veyance of weapons. In affirming the conviction, the court said there
plainly was no danger shown which required the taking of weapons
from their prison cell to the prison tower and the escape attempt could
have been made equally well without weapons.
United States v. Scott 38 presented the review of a conviction for
wilfully and knowingly preparing and filing a false individual income
tax return. 39 The government relied upon two types of proof, the net
worth and expenditures method and the specific items approach. The
opinion is particularly informative in outlining the methods used by
the IRS in preparing this type of litigation. The principal defense was
that the money received were gifts, rather than income subject to tax.
135. Garza, 664 F.2d at 141-42.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1792 (1976).
137. 670 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1982).
138. 660 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
139. See 26 U.S.C. §7206(1) (1976).
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The government's theory was that the appellant acquired political con-
tributions and then converted them to his own personal use, making
these converted contributions taxable income.140
The court affirmed the conviction, saying that the jury could have
decided that these payments of monies from many individuals to the
appellant were either compensation for favors performed as a public
official or the conversion of campaign funds, making the money taxa-
ble income. 141 In addition, the court noted that defense counsel virtu-
ally conceded guilt during his closing argument by telling the jury that
even if the defendant converted a particular campaign contribution to
his own use, it was only $5,000, a sum too insubstantial to support a
conviction. The reviewing court disagreed that the sum was insubstan-
tial, finding that the single $5,000 converted campaign payment was
sufficient evidence to support the appellant's conviction.1
42
B. Introduction of Prior Transcript
A firefighter, whose duties as a firefighter did not include individ-
ual inspections of residential units, was convicted of wrongfully using
his position to extort $150 from an individual who owned several apart-
ment buildings in Chicago. The first trial ended in a hung jury. The
second trial culminated in a conviction for violation of the Hobbs
Act. 143 In United States v. Walker, 44 appellant argued that the trial
judge erred by allowing the government to introduce selected portions
of the defendant's testimony from the first trial, while refusing to admit
other relevant testimony, in violation of Rule 106 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
At Walker's second trial, the government introduced fourteen
pages of Walker's direct testimony and a short excerpt of his cross ex-
amination from the first trial. Defense counsel objected to this, and
requested the contemporaneous admission of the entire twenty-eight
pages of Walker's testimony, or at least the remaining five pages of his
direct testimony.
The court held that most of Walker's excluded testimony qualified
140. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); United States v. Miriani, 422 F.2d 150, 152 (6th Cir.), ceri. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970);
Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 1934).
141. See United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947, 950 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). See also William G. Stratton, 54 T.C. 255, 280-
81 (1970) (the line between an outright gift and a campaign contribution is a very thin line).
142. 660 F.2d at 1175.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976).
144. 652 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1981).
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for admission under Rule 106, particularly in a criminal case where the
defendant elects not to testify. If the government does not submit all
relevant portions of prior testimony which the government desires of-
fered into evidence, the excluded portions may never be admitted. This
result penalizes a defendant in a criminal case for failing to testify at
his second trial. Since the evidence in the instant case was close, the
court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In a second case, a witness to an extortion setting testified under
oath before a grand jury. During the subsequent Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion, this witness, Chiampas, was subpoenaed to appear and did ap-
pear, but he refused to answer any questions, though ordered twice to
do so by the judge. Chiampas explained that he feared for his life. He
was then excused, and the government offered in evidence his grand
jury transcript. The district court admitted it, and it was read to the
jury. Chiampas' grand jury testimony was later corroborated by a tape
recording and by the testimony of eyewitnesses to the extortion threats.
On appeal, the appellants in United States v. Boulahanis 145 argued that
admission of the grand jury transcript into evidence violated both the
sixth amendment and Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, since
a transcript cannot be cross examined. The court disagreed, saying that
it would have been needlessly cruel to put Chiampas to a choice be-
tween going to jail and running the risk of being killed. The introduc-
tion of the grand jury transcript, in the opinion of the court, complied
with the requirements of Rule 804, since all that is required is that the
hearsay evidence is the most probative evidence reasonably available
on a material issue in the case. 146
In this case, it was material for the government to show that the
appellants had beaten up the victim the night before, as witnessed by
Chiampas prior to the taped conversation. The beating was further ev-
idence that the transaction discussed in the taped conversation was ex-
tortionate and not, as the appellants argued, a normal business
transaction. When Chiampas' grand jury testimony was read into evi-
dence, the government had no other direct evidence that the appellants
were involved in beating up the victim. Moreover, the court concluded
that introduction of the grand jury transcript did not violate the con-
frontation clause of the sixth amendment.147 The fact that Chiampas
was not available for cross examination did not violate the sixth
145. 677 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
146. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1976).
147. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); accord, United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169,
1176 (7th Cir. 1982).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
amendment. The admission of hearsay evidence is not a per se viola-
tion of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. The court
reasoned that the grand jury transcript was admissible, since it was ac-
curately reported and the accuracy was not challenged. Further,
Chiampas' statement was made voluntarily and under oath at the
grand jury proceedings and was corroborated at the trial by other high-
ly probative evidence, including tape recording and eyewitness
accounts.
C. Trial Exhibits
In a federal prosecution for the killing of a fellow inmate, the ap-
pellants argued in United States v. Bruscino148 that jurors' exposure to
extraneous and prejudicial material during the trial tainted the verdicts
against them. The court agreed, and reversed and remanded for a new
trial. The first of two pieces of prejudicial information was a Bureau of
Prisons letter indicating that one of the two appellants was being inves-
tigated for his suspected involvement in the Mexican Mafia. The sec-
ond item was a newspaper article concerning the trial that one of the
jurors carried into the jury room in her purse. The article said that a
third defendant in the case plead guilty to conspiring to murder the
prison inmate. The juror later advised the court that she carried the
article to the courtroom for the other jurors to read.
The district court refused to order a new trial. The Bureau of Pris-
ons letter was used during the trial to cross examine a government wit-
ness. The letter was left on the exhibit table, but not admitted into
evidence. During a court recess, the court clerk took the exhibits to the
jury room. At the conclusion of the trial, and shortly after the jury
deliberations began, the jury asked to see the Bureau of Prisons letter,
and was advised that it was not in evidence. The court's opinion criti-
cized the district court for allowing exhibits to be taken out of the court
room and into the jury room after admission but prior to deliberations:
Although we were informed during oral argument that it is
"common practice" for exhibits to be taken to the jury room after
admission but prior to deliberations, we question the wisdom of such
practice, which we find quite irregular. Not only does it lead to mis-
haps such as that at issue here, but it could easily cause jurors to
distort the import of certain exhibits prior to proper instructions at
the conclusion of the case.1
49
The court reversed and remanded, saying that there was a reason-
148. 662 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1981).
149. Id at 457 n.6.
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able possibility that this material may have affected the jury's
verdict. ' 50
D. Expert Witnesses
In a federal prosecution for perjury, the government introduced
the testimony of an astronomer to show that a photograph alleged by
appellant to have been taken on May 12 could not have been taken on
that date, but could have been taken only on the morning of April 13 or
August 31. The government's expert expounded the theory that if one
knew the compass orientation of an object in a photograph, it would be
possible to date that photograph by certain measurements of the
shadow in the photograph as related to the sun. Certain measurements
defining the "intersection point of the altitude and the azimuth, defin-
ing the sun's position in the sky, corresponds to the only two dates of
the year on which the photograph in question could have been
taken."' 151 The expert opinion relied in part on a "sun chart," which
the appellant claimed was in violation of his sixth amendment right to
confront his accusers.
The court in United States Y. Tranowski152 reversed the conviction,
believing that the astronomer predicated his opinion on unreliable
premises and that the technology relied upon was not sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field. 153 Re-
lying upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Brown, 154 the
Seventh Circuit endorsed the conclusion reached by that court:
A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant in
a criminal prosecution should not hang on his ability to successfully
rebut scientific evidence which bears an 'aura of special reliability
and truthworthiness,' although, in reality the witness is testifying on
the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated experiment which
has yet to gain general acceptance in its field.'
55
United States v. Lawson'56 raised the question of the admission of
hearsay testimony by the government's expert psychiatrist, thereby re-
stricting the appellant's ability to confront an adverse witness. In
150. 662 F.2d at 457-59. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); United States v.
Brunson, 657 F.2d 110, 115 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972, 978 (7th Cir.
1940).
151. United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1981).
152. Id
153. Id at 756; e.g., Frye v. United States, 393 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); WALTZ, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 321-22 (1975).
154. 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
155. Tranowski, 659 F.2d at 757, citing Brown, 557 F.2d at 556.
156. 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981).
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United States v. Bohle157 the court had held that a medical expert may
not give his opinion if it is based on information obtained out of court
from third persons, since such an opinion would depend on hearsay.
In Lawson, the court stated that the introduction of expert testi-
mony based in large part on hearsay may raise serious constitutional
problems if there is no adequate opportunity to cross examine the wit-
ness.' 58 Since the court believed that Lawson did have that opportu-
nity, his right to confront witnesses was not violated. Since the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the scope of permis-
sible expert testimony has been expanded. Rule 703119 expressly per-
mits experts to base their testimony on evidence that would otherwise
be inadmissible, so long as it is "of a type reasonably relied on by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject." 
1 6 0
The court said that in criminal cases, a court's inquiry under Rule
703 must go beyond finding that hearsay relied upon by an expert
meets these standards.1 6' A criminal defendant must also have access
to the hearsay information relied upon by the expert witness, because
without such access, effective cross-examination is impossible. The
court believed that Lawson had sufficient access to the information
which the government's medical expert used to reach his opinion on the
issue of sanity. Although the expert never interviewed Lawson in pri-
vate, the court concluded that the doctor did have some contact with
Lawson, and under these circumstances the government's expert testi-
mony did not violate Lawson's right to confront witnesses.
E Closing Argument
1. Waiver
In United States v. Spears, 62 the trial judge did not offer defense
counsel an opportunity to make closing argument, and defense counsel
did not request such an opportunity. The Supreme Court in Herring v.
157. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
158. Lawson, 653 F.2d at 301.
159. FED. R. EVID. 703.
160. 653 F.2d at 302; see Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1980).
161. Id at 303, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); see, e.g., WEINSTEIN, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 703(03) 703-18 (1980) ("In a criminal case, even though Rule 703 warrants
the use of hearsay as a basis for an opinion, the constitutional right of confrontation may require
that the defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine the persons who prepared the underly-
ing data on which the expert relies.").
162. 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982).
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New York, 63 held that it is reversible error for the trial court to deny
the defendant an opportunity to present a closing argument. The Court
reasoned that the opportunity to make a closing argument is an integral
part of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The denial of this funda-
mental right must result in the reversal of the conviction, without re-
gard to whether the defendant was prejudiced.164
In Herring, the defendant requested the opportunity to make a
closing argument, but his request was denied. In the present case, the
government argued, the trial court did not actively deny closing argu-
ment because Spears never requested it. No other federal circuit had
ruled on this exact issue. The Seventh Circuit, in a case of first impres-
sion, held that where, as in Spears, the record clearly demonstrates that
the defendant had ample opportunity to request summation before the
verdict was announced, but made no such request, and thereafter failed
to bring the issue to the trial court's attention, the right of summation
was waived.
Obviously, trial counsel must be alert to ensure that any opportu-
nity desired for closing argument is brought to the attention of the dis-
trict court. In the event that a judge should announce the verdict on
the heels of the close of the evidence, it would be unrealistic to suggest
that the failure to request constitutes a waiver.
65
2. Prejudicial
The court in United States v. Wilkins, 66 expressed concern with
the prosecutor's closing argument in a bank robbery prosecution, and
exclaimed, "[t]his court has repeatedly admonished prosecutors to
avoid even subtle references to a defendant's failure to testify," most
recently reversing a conviction when a blatantly improper reference
was made in United States v. Rodriquez.167 In the instant case, the
court said that the prosecutor overstepped the bounds of propriety
when he stated that the government theory of defendant's car being
used as the alternative getaway car was the "only explanation" put
before the jury, and that the defense should explain why the defendant
163. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
164. Id. at 863.
165. Spears, 671 F.2d at 994.
166. 659 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1981).
167. 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980). See United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978); United States v. Fearnes, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. United
States v. Scott, 660 F.2d 1145, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (the de-
fendant contended that the government unfairly commented on his failure to produce and to
stipulate to certain evidence).
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was found in the getaway car. The court said that these statements do
not explicitly say that the defendant did not testify. Rather, these state-
ments are more like statements that the prosecution theory is "uncon-
tradicted" or "undisputed."'
' 68
The court nonetheless affirmed Wilkins' conviction, saying that the
prosecutor's argument did not rise to the level of a Rodriquez comment,
where a prosecutor said that a defendant "has been very quiet" during
the trial, explicitly drawing to the jury's attention the defendant's si-
lence. 169 In addition, the evidence adduced at Wilkins' trial included
overwhelming evidence of guilt.' 70 However, the court noted that Wil-
kins' trial occurred prior to Rodriquez, saying that the court's conclu-
sions in the instant case might well have been different if there was any
indication that the prosecutor was attempting to skirt the limits of Rod-
riquez, ignoring the "spirit of that case."
71
In a different case, the quest for a conviction following a four-day
trial helped the federal prosecutor run afoul of the Seventh Circuit's
mandate expressed in United States v. Rodriquez 72 by alluding to the
failure of the defendants to deny their role in the alleged offenses. In
United States v. Hastings, 73 the court reversed the convictions and re-
manded for a new trial. The court stated that:
[d]irect reference by a prosecutor to a defendant's election not to tes-
tify at trial is clearly proscribed. Groin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). Indirect comments such as the prosecutor's references in this
case to "uncontradicted testimony" constitute error when the state-
ments are "manifestly intended to be or [are] of such a character that
the jury [will] naturally and necessarily take [them] to be comment
on the defendant's failure to testify." United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d
505, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968). This court has
previously held that when a prosecutor refers to testimony as uncon-
tradicted where the defendant has elected not to testify and when he
is the only person able to dispute the testimony, such reference neces-
sarily focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to testify
and constitutes error. United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853, 855
(7th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th
Cir. 1967). 174
168. See Buege, 578 F.2d at 188.
169. See Rodriquez, 627 F.2d at I11.
170. Wilkins was arrested in the getaway car a few blocks from the bank and the stolen money
and two guns were found inside the car. 659 F.2d at 774.
171. Wilkins, 659 F.2d at 774 n.5.
172. 627 F.2d 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1980).
173. 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Hasting, - U.S. -, 51
U.S.L.W. 4572 (1983).
174. Id at 303, quoting United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 871 (1978).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
The court recognized that the serious nature of the crimes commit-
tes by the defendants and the clear evidence of guilt could raise the
issue of harmless error. However, the court said that holding the prose-
cutor's remarks harmless would impermissibly compromise the defend-
ants' fifth amendment rights. The court relied upon language from the
Rodriquez decision as applicable to the instant litigation: "The re-
marks, harmless or not, infringing upon such a basic and elementary
constitutional underpinning of our justice system, simply should not
occur." 1
75
F Instructions to the Jury
The court was faced with the issue of whether it is reversible error
to give an instruction defining "reasonable doubt." In United States v.
Regilio ,176 the court repeated its previous admonition that the district
court should not give any instruction defining "reasonable doubt."'
177
However, the court refused to reverse the conviction, finding that there
was no harm to the defendant. The court took the opportunity to ad-
vise district courts that "we will not hesitate to find reversible error in






In United States v. Mooney, 17 9 the defendant received the maxi-
mum sentence for bank robbery. However, the trial judge specified
that because the defendant was suffering from multiple sclerosis, the
defendant would be sentenced under the provisions which make the
defendant eligible for parole at such time as the Parole Commission
may determine. 80 The defendant argued that while sentencing under
this provision might appear to benefit him, the court's remarks during
175. Hastings, 660 F.2d at 303, citing Rodriquez, 627 F.2d at 113. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the Seventh Circuit, reversing Hastings because the error alleged was harmless. -
U.S -, 51 U.S.L.W. 4572.
176. 669 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 596 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975). See also Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 2.07 recommending
that no instruction defining "reasonable doubt" be given.
178. Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1178.
179. 654 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1981).
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
sentencing actually operated as a mandate to the Parole Commission
not to release the defendant under any circumstances except for severe
illness. The appellant contended that the district court's statement,
"the healthier he remains, the longer he stays in prison," was intended
by the judge to be an attempt to restrict the discretion of the Parole
Commission. Appellant urged that the judge's remarks rose to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment, and further denied him equal protec-
tion of the laws. The court affirmed, allowing the maximum sentence
to remain. The court said that even if the district judge intended the
Commission to be bound by his recommendation, sentencing judges do
not have the authority to supervise, control, or second-guess the Parole
Board. 18
The court declined the defendant's invitation to adopt the princi-
ples of the ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Pro-
cedures as mandatory factors for consideration by district courts in
sentencing. The court believed that mandatory consideration of a list
of factors would unnecessarily restrict the district court's broad discre-
tion, and could easily lead to a very mechanistic analysis in the imposi-
tion of sentence.1
8 2
2. Motion to Reduce
A question of first impression for the Seventh Circuit was raised in
United States v. Inendino,183 which concerned the extent of a district
court's jurisdiction over a Rule 35 motion 84 for reduction of sentence.
The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider new
evidence offered in a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 mo-
tion filed beyond the 120-day limit in the rule. Rule 35 does not refer
to any time period during which a defendant must make his motion'to
reduce sentence but it imposes instead a limit on the time during which
the sentencing judge may act to reduce the sentence. This time limit is
jurisdictional, 85 and it may not be extended by the district court.
186
181. 654 F.2d at 489, citing Edwards v. United States, 574 F.2d 937, 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1040 (1978).
182. 654 F.2d at 488 n.7.
183. 655 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1981).
184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 reads in relevant part:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or
within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order or judg-
ment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judg-
ment of conviction.
185. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 (1979) (dictum).
186. FED. R. App. P. 45(b).
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The court said that the purpose of the rule is to protect the district court
from recurrent requests from defendants to reconsider their sentences,
and to prevent the courts from becoming an alternative to the Parole
Commission as a means of release from custody.
187
One of the purposes of Rule 35 is to permit defendants to present
new evidence not available at sentencing. A defendant may do so by
motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 motion, but that evidence
must be presented within the 120-day limit established in the rule. The
court suggested that a defendant can easily avoid complications by
filing his Rule 35 motion within the first sixty days after sentencing.
The district court would then have adequate time to decide the motion
before the expiration of its jurisdiction, and the defendant would prob-
ably have time to file a motion for reconsideration within the 120-day
time period.
I8 8
A repeater in the bank robbery field was again convicted for the
offense, and received the maximum term of imprisonment. The trial
judge denied the defendant's motion to reduce sentence. 8 9 In United
States v. Mooney, 90 the defendant asked the court to exercise its super-
visory power to rule that, in the absence of new factors, a prosecutor's
promise to recommend a particular sentence forbids the government
from thereafter opposing a defendant's Rule 35 motion to reduce a sen-
tence imposed in excess of that recommended. The appellant urged
that United States v. Ewing'9 controls his situation since the govern-
ment in Ewing agreed not to oppose the defendant's request for proba-
tion if the defendant pled guilty, but on a Rule 35 motion the
prosecutor vigorously opposed the probation. The Fifth Circuit in Ew-
ing remanded the case to allow the Rule 35 motion to be heard by a
different judge, without government opposition to probation.
92
However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Mooney's conviction, be-
lieving that it would be inappropriate to prohibit the government from
ever opposing a Rule 35 motion for sentences which exceed the recom-
mendation agreed upon in the plea bargain. The court said that mat-
ters could occur in the interim which might make the earlier
recommendation inappropriate. However, the court did not sanction
government opposition in such cases. The court cautioned that a slight
187. United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. United
States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1975).
188. Inendino, 655 F.2d at 110.
189. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
190. 654 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1981).
191. 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973).
192. Mooney, 654 F.2d at 485, citing Ewing, 480 F.2d at 1143.
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change in facts could well mandate a different result. The Seventh Cir-
cuit opinion offered the following advice for prosecutors to consider:
Thus, in future cases of this nature, the government would proceed
with a greater sense of propriety, and the defendant's interests would
more certainly be protected, if the Government responded to such a
defendant's Rule 35 motion by stating that it had previously recom-
mended a particular sentence, that the court had declined to follow
the recommendation, and that the Government does, or does not,
have any reason to retract its previous recommendation.'
93
3. Appellate Review
In United States v. Plisek,194 the issue was whether the sentencing
court relied improperly on the defendant's previous acquittal in impos-
ing sentence. The defendant claimed that the sentence was simply too
harsh, in light of sentencing statistics, the nature of the drug involved,
and the defendant's good character. A dispute developed in the district
court as to whether an earlier jury verdict of not guilty was in fact a
complete exoneration of the defendant. The court affirmed, relying
heavily on a line of Seventh Circuit cases indicating that judicial dis-
cretion regarding sentencing "will not be disturbed on appeal except on
a plain showing of gross abuse."' 195
In dissent, the issue was framed as whether a trial judge may prop-
erly rely upon his own evaluation of the merits of a defendant's prior
acquittal in making a sentencing determination, an issue never ex-
pressly decided in the Seventh Circuit. Although other circuits have
expressly held that a sentencing judge may properly rely upon defend-
ant's prior acquittals, 96 the dissent in Plisek stated that such a rule
conflicts with well-established principles of due process.
197
B. Parole Issue
Earlier in the term, the court ruled that the Illinois parole release
193. Mooney, 654 F.2d at 487. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
194. 657 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1981).
195. Id. at 924, citing United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1201 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Willard, 445 F.2d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1971): cf. United
States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 467 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982) (a sentencing court
should not, absent special circumstances not present in the case, assume the guilt of a defendant
based upon events which are the subject of another ongoing prosecution).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1979): United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir.
1972).
197. Plisek, 657 F.2d at 930 (Swygert, J., dissenting). See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736,
741 (1948); United States v. Bailey, 547 F.2d 68, 71 (8th Cir. 1976) (the sentencing judge must not
equate arrests as evidence of prior wrongdoing).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
statute 98 provides an inmate with a legitimate expectation of parole
which is entitled to constitutional protection. 99 In Solomon v. Elsea ,200
the court applied the authority of Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex 20 1 in declaring that the federal parole
statute202 provides an inmate with an expectation of parole worthy of
due process protection. However, in Solomon the court ruled the ex-
cessive amount of hashish involved in his crime was "good cause" to
deny parole, subject only to the abuse of discretion standard.
20 3
The appellant had urged the court to adopt a "sufficiency of the
evidence" standard of review for factual situations such as presented in
this case which showed favorable and positive information concerning
Solomon which would have made him a much more favorable parole
candidate. The court declined the invitation to adopt this broad stan-
dard of review, saying that a court of review need only determine
whether the information relied on by the parole commission is suffi-
cient to provide a factual basis for its reasons. Since there was no
showing of abuse of discretion by the parole commission, the court af-




In an indictment charging the defendants with a scheme to artifi-
cially inflate year-end inventories and thus increase their reported prof-
its, the jury returned verdicts of guilty to conspiracy, mail fraud, and
securities fraud. One defendant claimed the jury instructions put the
burden of proving withdrawal from the conspiracy on him and failed to
put the burden of disproving withdrawal beyond a reasonable doubt on
the government. In United States v. Read ,2 4 the court agreed and re-
versed the conspiracy conviction and remanded for a new trial. The
court said that due process requires that the prosecution prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.20 5 In addition, the court cited various cases holding that the
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1981).
199. United States ex rel. Scott v. Ill. Parole and Pardon Board, 668 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1982).
200. 676 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982).
201. 442 U.S. 1 (1978).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 4200 el seq (1976).
203. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4218(d) and 4203(b)(1) (1976).
204. 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981).
205. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
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prosecution's burden often includes disproving defenses because they
bring into question facts necessary for conviction.
2°6
The court noted the conspiracy statute20 7 requires the prosecution
to prove (1) that the alleged conspiracy existed; (2) that an overt act was
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant
knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy. The
court said that the prosecution for this offense is also subject to a five-
year statute of limitations which runs from the date of the last overt
act.208 To convict a defendant, the prosecution must prove that the
conspiracy existed and that each defendant was a member of the con-
spiracy at some point in the five years preceding the date of the
indictment.
209
One defendant alleged he withdrew from the conspiracy. The
court said that withdrawal is not a complete defense since a defendant
is still liable for his previous agreement, and for the previous acts of his
co-conspirators in pursuit of the conspiracy. 210 The government in-
sisted that the law requires the burden of proving withdrawal be on the
defendant. 211 The court agreed that the law appears to require the de-
fendant to "prove" or "establish" withdrawal. The Seventh Circuit had
previously aeld that it "is well-settled [that] this burden of establishing
withdrawal lies on the defendant. '21 2 The court said the prosecutor's
reliance on Hyde v. United States was misplaced since the court now
believes Hyde placed only the burden of going forward on the defend-
ant.21 3 The court reviewed the split in the various federal circuits on
this issue and decided to overrule United States v. Dorn2t 4 and those
cases imposing the burden of proving withdrawal on the defendant.
215
The court ruled the circumstances in the case demonstrate that the
erroneous instruction on withdrawal was prejudicial to one of the de-
fendants (Spiegel) and a new trial on the conspiracy count would be
required. The court noted that the new Seventh Circuit rule mandates
206. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (insanity); United States v.
Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (entrapment); United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879, 882
(10th Cir. 1977) (self-defense); United States v. Sennett, 505 F.2d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1974) (in-
sanity); United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719, 723 (3d Cir. 1971) (alibi); United States v. Landry,
257 F.2d 425, 429-430 (7th Cir. 1958) (entrapment).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
209. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957).
210. See United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966).
211. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
212. United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir. 1977).
213. Read, 658 F.2d at 1235-36, citing United States v. Hyde, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
214. 561 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1977).
215. Read, 658 F.2d at 1236 n.7.
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that the burden of going forward with evidence of withdrawal, and
with evidence that he withdrew prior to the statute of limitations, re-
mains on the defendant. However, once the defendant advances suffi-
cient evidence, the burden of persuasion is on the prosecution to
disprove the defense of withdrawal beyond a reasonable doubt. As in
the cases of other defenses, the court said that once the jury has been
instructed on the withdrawal defense, the jury should be instructed that
the government bears the burden of disproving withdrawal beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court noted that the type of evidence necessary
to create a jury question on withdrawal is not at all affected by the new
ruling.216 To avoid all liability, the defendant must come forward with
evidence that he withdrew prior to the statute of limitations. The court
noted that the import of the decision is that the showing is only one of
production, not persuasion.
21 7
B. Impersonation of afederal officer.
Before this term the Seventh Circuit had not yet been required to
address the issue of whether an indictment charging the false imperson-
ation of a federal officer is defective if it does not allege that the de-
fendant acted with "intent to defraud. 2 18 In United States v. Cord,
2 19
the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss, contending that intent to
defraud is an essential element of the crime of impersonating a federal
officer and, therefore, its omission rendered the indictment defective.
The evidence showed the defendant, pretending to be an agent of the
FBI, obtained money from a woman by using that guise. He was con-
victed and appealed. On appeal, the defendant relied upon cases de-
cided by the Fifth Circuit which held that intent to defraud remains an
essential element for prosecution under § 912.220
The reviewing court acknowledged there was a split in the circuits.
It examined the Fifth Circuit reasoning in light of the reasoning of
other circuits and decided to "join ranks with the other circuit courts
that have held that intent to defraud need not be alleged in the
indictment."
221
216. Id at 1236 n.8 (citing United States v. United States Gympsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 463-
465 (1978), and Instructions 5.12 of the Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit).
217. 658 F.2d at 1236 n.8.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1976).
219. 654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1981).
220. United States v. Pollard, 486 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Randolph, 460
F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972); Honea v. United States, 334 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1965).
221. See United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Rose, 500
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Mitman,
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C. Assault with a dangerous weapon.
The court disposed of another attack on an indictment in the case
of United States v. Phillippi222 by adopting the Ninth Circuit rule which
decided that it was not necessary to recite, in an indictment charging
assault with a dangerous weapon, that the assault was "without just
cause or excuse.
'223
D. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICOQ.
In United States v. Forszt,224 a member of the board of commis-
sioners was indicted on one count for violating a provision of the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 225 in that he
solicited and received periodic payments of money to influence him in
the discharge of his official duties in violation of the Indiana bribery
statute and the Hobbs Act, § 1951, covering interference with com-
merce through extortion. 226 According to the indictment, defendant
solicited 8% of the gross receipts that a local office equipment company
received from the county contracts during a twenty-five year period.
The defendant claimed the evidence at trial showed the payments re-
ceived were political contributions, not bribes. A conviction followed
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
In Forszt, the appellant also argued that the statute of limitations
of five years had run before the indictment was filed. The indictment
was filed on March 25, 1980, and charged inter alia, that on or about
March 26, 1975, defendant received $6,000 from the office equipment
company in violation of the Indiana bribery statute and the Hobbs Act.
The evidence at trial proved that said payment occurred in early April
1975 thereby dismissing the defendant's argument in part. But the de-
fendant argued that since his term of office as a county commissioner
ended on December 31, 1974, there could be no act of bribery under
Indiana law or the Hobbs Act when he received the payment in April
1975, so that there was no violation of RICO within the five years pre-
ceding the filing of the indictment. The court disposed of this theory by
interpreting Indiana case law as holding that Indiana bribery is a con-
459 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
222. 655 F.2d 792 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 974 (1981).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976); Hockenberry v. United States, 442 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir.
1970).
224. 655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981).
225. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
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tinuing offense. The court said that payments made as part of an ar-
rangement to influence a public official in the discharge of his duties
are violations of Indiana law regardless of whether the money is paid
before or after the bargained-for acts are performed.
The court added that Hobbs Act extortion is also a continuing of-
fense so that no statute of limitations problem exists where, as here,
there is a single continuous plan of extortion embracing multiple pay-
ments over a period of years. 227 The evidence showed that payments
were made with the intent to influence the defendant in the discharge
of his duties and that defendant knew it, thus constituting bribes under
Indiana law, and not political contributions as the defendant con-
tended. The Seventh Circuit had earlier held that it was a violation of
the Hobbs Act for a public official to sell his public trust before being
installed in office. 228 In this case, the court extended the coverage by
holding that it is unlawful for a public official to sell his public trust
while in office even though the last installment for the services rendered
is to come after he leaves office.
In a second case, an enterprising sheriff in Illinois, shortly after his
inauguration as sheriff, discussed with various individuals his knowl-
edge that deputies were receiving kickbacks from automobile towing
companies and houses of prostitution within the county and he wanted
the payoffs to the deputies stopped. The sheriffs instructions were that
any money should go to him and not the deputies. Various establish-
ments were visited by persons on behalf of the sheriff, and in each case
the operators were informed that the sheriff wanted all further pay-
ments to made to him. Negotiations with the owners regarding the
price per prostitute or per automobile tow were firmed up in many
instances.
In addition to the towing and prostitution payoffs, a second aspect
of the corruption by the sheriff and his deputy, involved the county
deputy sheriffs association. This association had been formed as a bar-
gaining unit for the deputies and later became merely a social and
charitable organization. An agreement was reached that would allow
the sheriff to secure 10% of the gross money collected by the associa-
tion. In 1978, a federal grand jury indicted the sheriff and others for
conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Statute [RICO].
2 2 9
227. See United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965
(1981); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
228. United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1977).
229. The statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), was enacted as Title IX of the Organized
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A conviction resulted on the RICO conspiracy charge and various
other charges. The appeal followed. In United States v. Lee Stoller
Enterprises, Inc. ,230 the case presented issues arising from the prosecu-
tions under RICO, particularly whether a public entity, such as here
the office of county sheriff, can be a RICO "enterprise." The defend-
ants' principal contention was that the RICO statute may not properly
be applied to them because the county sheriffs office was not an "enter-
prise" within the meaning of the statute.
The Seventh Circuit had in the previous term ruled in a case in-
volving a city police department, 23' holding that "enterprise" encom-
passes public bodies and entities as well as private entities. Soon
thereafter, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Turkette232 and
after examining the legislative history and the language of the statute,
the Court emphatically rejected any narrow definition of the term "en-
terprise", holding that an "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO
includes illegal enterprises as well as legitimate ones. 233 In light of the
Supreme Court's conclusion and in addition to the Circuit's earlier
holding in United States v. Grzywacz, 234 and related precedent, the
court concluded that the office of Madison County Sheriff is such a
RICO enterprise and affirmed the conviction.
E. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
A counterman in the Torrens section of the Cook County Re-
corder of Deeds office was charged with 29 counts of violating The
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)235 by accepting pay-
ments for Torrens filings which were in excess of those authorized by
state law. Each extra payment was the basis of a separate count of the
indictment. It was uncontested that such extra payments were ac-
cepted. At trial a number of bank employees testified that they were
told by their bank superiors, usually during training sessions, that they
should regularly make these additional payments to the countermen.
This activity resulted in a conviction. On appeal in United States v.
Crime Control Act of 1970. Specifically, defendants were charged with a violation of § 1962(d), a
conspiracy to violate RICO.
230. 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
231. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980)
(case concerned the City of Madison (Ill.) Police Department, and not the county sheriff's office,
but otherwise the facts were closely related to the events in the instant case).
232. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
233. Id. at 587.
234. 603 F.2d at 685-87.
235. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976).
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Gannon ,236 the claim was that RESPA does not apply to these pay-
ments because they were "gratuities," not "portions of the charges"
made for settlement services "other than for services actually per-
formed. ' 237 A panel of the Seventh Circuit initially agreed with appel-
lant's interpretation and reversed his conviction.
238
The instant opinion followed an en banc rehearing. The majority
affirmed the conviction, expressing the belief that a single individual
can violate RESPA by receiving in his official capacity a "charge" for
the rendering of settlement services, but personally keeping a portion of
the charge in fact for something other than the performance of those
services. Although there was no testimony offered that appellant re-
quested or solicited these extra payments, one of the bank employees
testified that after she ceased making the payments for her bank, appel-
lant told her that she worked for a "cheap bank" and if "something
were not done," the bank's "work would not get done."
The appellant charged on appeal that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague, but the court quickly disposed of this argument finding
it sufficient to pass constitutional muster. The court said it is well es-
tablished that in light of the strong validity that attaches to Acts of
Congress, the fact that individuals may differ regarding whether or not
certain marginal offenses fall within a specific statute's terms does not
by itself render the statute unconstitutional. Congress' intent was to
make illegal any abusive practice that unreasonably inflated the cost of
real estate settlement services to the public.
239
Two judges dissented, believing the defendant to be guilty of ac-
cepting bribes or perhaps of committing acts of extortion but the prose-
cution by the government on a theory of violation of RESPA was in the
eyes of the dissent "irrational. ' ' 240 Their reasoning included a belief
that Section 2607 of RESPA makes eminently good sense and will
work well in the context of the evils it was designed to address. Its
application to a set of facts, as in the instant case, is not the design of
the statute, where a gratuity or bribe is being paid to a public official to
properly perform his assigned duty and where he is in no position to do
any other favor. In light of the position of the Seventh Circuit one
might project the United States Attorney's Offices may in the future
236. 684 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1981).
237. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (1976).
238. United States v. Gannon, No. 80-1108 (7th Cir. 1980) (unpublished opinion).
239. 684 F.2d at 438.
240. Id. at 441 (Cudahy, J., and Swygert, J., dissenting).
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ensnare some more interesting specimens in such prosecutions than a
counter-man in the Torrens section of a county recorder of deeds.
F Hobbs Act
In United States v. Kendall,24 1 the principal issue on appeal was
whether the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted
evidence concerning conversations among members of the Indiana
Surety Agents Association (ISAA) pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 242 The appellant was convicted following a
jury trial on three counts of violating the Hobbs Act. 243 The first count
alleged a conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion.
Counts two and three alleged extortions on two dates in 1979 from the
ISAA.
The ISAA was an organization of bail bondsmen in the State of
Indiana. Its principal purpose was to lobby for legislation favorable to
the bail bond industry. Certain legislation of interest to ISAA was
pending before the Indiana House and Senate. The ISAA arranged
with appellant, doing business as a corporation, to act as "legislative
director" for a fee. The appellant's associates eventually made an ar-
rangement with the President Pro Tempore of the Indiana Senate to
provide the payments the senator wanted for favorable treatment on
the pending legislation. The Officers of ISAA met and agreed to raise
funds and to make contributions for the purpose of paying off the Pres-
ident Pro Tempore. The meeting was tape-recorded by the ISAA Presi-
dent and was the subject-matter of appellant's objections at trial and on
appeal.
The appellant argued it was prejudicial error to admit as substan-
tive evidence of the conspiracy testimony about conversations among
ISAA members-in particular, the tape recording. The appellant ar-
gued that it was legally impossible for the ISAA members to be co-
conspirators under the Hobbs Act, and therefore, it was error for the
court to admit the testimony pursuant to Rule 801 (d)(2)(E). The appel-
lant further reasoned that because the ISAA was the victim to the ex-
tortion, its members could not have been charged as Hobbs Act co-
conspirators; therefore, it argued, conversations among ISAA members
should not have been admitted as substantive evidence pursuant to
241. 665 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
242. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides in part: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if. . .(2) The statement is offered against a party and is. . . (E) a state-
ment by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
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Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Kendall further relied for support on cases decided
under statutes other than the Hobbs Act which have held that the vic-
tim of the crime charged cannot be deemed a co-conspirator under the
pertinent statute.
244
The reviewing court disagreed, distinguishing the appellant's argu-
ment by saying "conspiracy" as an evidentiary concept, embodied in
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and "conspiracy" as a concept of substantive crimi-
nal law are not coterminous.245 To distinguish the two concepts, courts
have referred to the evidentiary principle as a "joint venture" excep-
tion, 246 or a "concert of action" exception. 247 The court said even if the
appellant's theory that a Hobbs Act victim cannot be a co-conspirator
as to his own extortion is correct, it does not appear from the record
that the district court relied on such a theory.
The court affirmed the conviction by saying an out-of-court state-
ment is admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if the judge finds by a
preponderance of the evidence "that the declarant and defendant were
members of a conspiracy at the time the hearsay statement was made,
and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. 248
The court held that this general rule requires only that the conspir-
acy introduced into evidence by the government be "factually inter-
twined" with the offense for which the defendant is being tried.249 It
was the conclusion of the court that the district court made the required
findings and only then admitted the challenged testimony pursuant to
Rule 801 (d)(2)(E).
In a different case, the chief electrician for Playboy Enterprises
was asked by his superiors to obtain a supervising electrician's license.
Playboy was initiating an austerity program at that time, and it was
thought that money could be saved if some of the major electrical reno-
vation and repairs in the Playboy Building were performed internally,
rather than hiring their outside electrical contractor to do the work.
In order for Playboy to do electrical work internally, it was neces-
sary for someone on Playboy's staff to be licensed to apply for work
244. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932); United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 111 I
(7th Cir. 1973); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941).
245. See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549-550 (7th Cir. 1979).
246. United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937
(1978).
247. United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1104 (1977).
248. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978); accord, United States v.
Medina-Herrera, 606 F.2d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
249. United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 194 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1980).
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permits issued by the City of Chicago, and this was the reason for the
request of Anderson, the employee. Anderson took the licensing exam-
ination but was fearful his application would not be successful. The
basic reason for his anxiety was that the city electrical inspector in
whose district the Playboy Building was located, might try to block the
application process. Anderson picked up some leads indicating that
certain precinct captains would be of assistance. One such precinct
captain told him "he had some connections at City Hall" and he would
see what he could do to "help." Eventually, this precinct captain,
Mattson, told Anderson that it would cost $3,000 to ensure that he
would get his license. Mattson split this money with another precinct
captain named Greene. Anderson never received his license, and de-
spite his request to both Mattson and Greene to return the $3,000 he
had paid, that money was never returned to him. Both Greene and
Mattson were indicted and convicted for conspiracy to violate the
Hobbs Act.2 50
The major issue resolving the appeal was the Seventh Circuit's ap-
plication of the "direct" and "indirect" effect on interstate commerce
test. The line of cases comprising the "direct" connection between ex-
tortion and interstate commerce or articles moving in interstate com-
merce in the Seventh Circuit consist of fact situations either threatening
or having potential adverse effects which never materialize because ex-
tortionate demands are met.25'
The second line of cases in the Seventh Circuit has established
another ground for the assertion of Hobbs Act jurisdiction, namely the
depletion-of-assets indirect effect on interstate commerce.25 2 Under the
depletion of assets theory, commerce is affected when an enterprise,
which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce or customarily
purchases items in interstate commerce, has its assets depleted through
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-55 (1976).
251. United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United
States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States
v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Amabile,
395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); United States v.
Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968); United States v. Kramer,
355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.), cert. granted in part and denied in part, 384 U.S. 100 (1966); accord, Stirone
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
252. United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hedman, 630
F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39
(7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Blakey, 607
F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Craig, 573 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d
139 (7th Ci. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
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extortion, thereby curtailing the victim's potential as a purchaser of
such goods.
The trial judge found that both Playboy and their outside electri-
cal contractor were engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal in
United States v. Mattson,253 the court agreed that one of the essential
elements of proof required to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act is
the effect on interstate commerce. The court reversed the conviction
outright, ruling the Hobbs Act requires that interstate commerce be af-
fected by extortion, not by a result of extortion. In this case there was
no sufficient nexus between the extortion perpetrated and interstate
commerce for federal jurisdiction to attach.
The court said the evidence clearly established that Playboy never
reimbursed Anderson for the extorted sum, saying, "[w]e would have a
different case if Playboy, a business, had been the victim of the extor-
tion instead of Anderson. ' 254 The victim in this case was an individual
who had no connection with interstate commerce at all, but whose only
connection was with a business which was engaged in interstate com-
merce. Therefore, the court said, there was no possibility of a direct
effect on interstate commerce by Anderson's payment of $3,000 in ef-
forts to secure an electrician's license. As for the depletion-of-assets
theory to bring the case within the Hobbs Act, the $3,000 was not from
Playboy, it was only Anderson's personal assets which were depleted by
the payment. Anderson himself was not conducting a business engaged
in, or purchasing items from, interstate commerce.
In light of this Mattson case it is evident that the extortion of
money from any individual in our society could arguably affect inter-
state commerce eventually. But to have federal jurisdiction within the
Hobbs Act there must be a nexus. In the instant case, any effect the
extortion had beyond the personal effect on the Playboy Enterprises
employee was too attenuated and was removed one step too far to come
within the Hobbs Act.
255
G. Re-entry of a Deported Alien
In United States v. Anton ,256 the court reversed the district court
conviction of the defendant for the reentry of a deported alien of-
fense. 257 The Seventh Circuit opinion created a conflict with the Ninth
253. 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
254. 671 F.2d at 1024-1025.
255. Id. at 1025.
256. 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1982).
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
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Circuit on the question of criminal intent under Sec. 1326.258 Two
other circuits have recognized the issue but have not had occasion to
resolve it.259
At trial the defendant introduced evidence indicating that he rea-
sonably believed he had obtained the necessary permission prior to his
reentry. However, at the close of the testimony the district court
adopted an instruction which included:
"... you are not to take into consideration any evidence as to con-
sent claimed by the defendant to have been obtained from any Gov-
ernment official who was not acting under the authority of the
Attorney General, or any evidence as to consent claimed by the de-
fendant to have been obtained after he had left a place outside the
United States."
The statute does not mention intent. The court considered the rel-
evant legislative history but that history was silent on the question.
The court analyzed the Ninth Circuit rule and agreed that common-
law principles of statutory construction are the appropriate tools for
ascertaining the legislative intent of this reentry statute260 but could not
accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that criminal intent is totally ir-
relevant. The court felt strict liability is generally inappropriate when
the offense is punishable by imprisonment or other severe sanctions. 26'
The court concluded by ruling that proof of intent was relevant
and if the defendant reasonably believed that he had the consent of the
Attorney General to reenter the United States, it would certainly be
unjust to subject him to criminal sanctions as imposed in this case. The
court ruled that a limited mistake of law defense is legally viable
against a Section 1326 charge. The court said that since the defendant
presented some evidence to support that defense in this case, he was




The case of United States v. Galloway263 involves the application
of the federal mail fraud statute264 to a scheme to defraud automobile
258. See Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
259. United States v. DiSanbillo, 615 F.2d 128, 132 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1980) (indicating that the
question remains open); United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (sug-
gesting in dictum that the Ninth Circuit's statutory construction is correct).
260. Penn-Cabanilas, 394 F.2d at 789.
261. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.18 (1978).
262. Cf. United States v. Snow, 670 F.2d 749, 752-753 (7th Cir. 1982).
263. 664 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2296 (1982).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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purchasers by "rolling back" automobile odometers. Following a jury
verdict of guilty, the district court directed a verdict for defendant. The
district court agreed the evidence showed sufficient proof to find Gallo-
way had formulated and carried out a scheme to defraud and related
elements of the offense. However, the district court held that the jury
did not have sufficient evidence from which to find that the use of the
mails was "for the purpose of executing" the scheme to defraud. The
mailings, in the opinion of the trial court, occurred "chronologically
after the scheme had reached fruition. .. "
In the court's opinion the starting point for analysis of a conviction
under the mail fraud statute was to determine the scope of the alleged
scheme. While the statute requires that the mailing occur for the pur-
pose of executing the scheme, 265 the various circuit court opinions have
given a broad interpretation to this phrase, and have held that mailings
"in furtherance" of the scheme meet the statute's jurisdictional require-
ment.266 Since the evidence in this case demonstrated the mailings
were necessary to complete the retail sale which was the final object of
the scheme, as well as to ensure the ongoing success of the scheme, the
court found Galloway's scheme to defraud fell within the prohibitions
of the statute. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judg-
ment and remanded the case with directions that the district court rein-
state the jury verdict of guilty.
The concurring opinion believed the present case was the "outer
limits" of the mail fraud statute, which was characterized as "this far-
ranging statute. '267 The dissent felt the mailings were not "sufficiently
closely related to respondent's scheme to bring his conduct within the
statute." 268
I Meaning of the term "explosive" /18 U S.C. Section 371]
A case worth noting for its expansive treatment of the meaning of
the word "explosive" in an activity affecting interstate commerce269 is
United States v. Agrilo-Ladlad.270 The defendants were convicted of
the substantive offense, 27' and on appeal contended that the statute272
265. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
266. Ohrynowicz v. United States, 542 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976);
United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
267. 664 F.2d at 166 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 169 (Swygert, J., dissenting); accord, United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
270. 675 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1982).
271. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976).
272. Id.
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is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. The evidence showed
the defendants conspired together to destroy the business owned by one
of the defendants, a commercial printing company, and to collect the
proceeds of the fire and casualty insurance covering the business. The
technique consisted of laying layers of newspapers in a row and con-
necting the major pieces of shop equipment to a central ignition point.
Thereafter, the defendant poured naphtha on the newspapers, using a
bucket and the contents of a large drum of naphtha. In the defendant's
efforts to assemble an electronic ignition unit which, connected with a
timing device, would pass a flame through the newspapers and ignite
the naphtha, he had to strip the insulation from some wires. Using a
match to burn the insulation off the wires, the defendant unintention-
ally set fire to his clothing, frustrating his efforts to further develop this
electronic ignition unit. After he extinguished the flames on his cloth-
ing, the defendant returned to the pressroom and ignited a piece of
newspaper, and then placed the burning paper on the newspapers he
had spread in various rows. He left the premises, locking the doors
behind him. The vapors apparently burned and an "explosive-type fire
resulted," from the igniting of the liquid accelerant.
At trial, a government expert testified that both naphtha and gaso-
line are potential explosives. It was this expert's opinion the printing
company damage resulted from the simultaneous ignition of vapor
which formed above the naphtha-soaked newspapers resulting in an
explosion. The question on appeal was whether naphtha soaked news-
papers strategically spread across the floor of a building for the purpose
of directing a fire and ignited by a burning newspaper is an "exposive"
or "incendiary device" as defined in the statute.
273
The court examined the legislative history and concluded that
Congress intended to define broadly the term "explosive" even if state
and federal jurisdiction would overlap in certain instances, such as ar-
son cases. The various circuits were split over the issue of whether
naphtha soaked newspapers, when ignited by fire, would be an explo-
sive for purposes of federal prosecution or if federal jurisdiction should
not be broadened to reach arson cases. 274
273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 232(5); 8440) (1976).
274. United States v. Poulos, 667 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1982) (the court held that a mixture of
gasoline and air was an explosive within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(j)); United States v. Gere,
662 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversed the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) in connection with
arson by use of photocopier fluid and ignition system and held that federal jurisdiction should not
be broadened to reach such arson cases); United States v. Hepp, 656 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1981) (a
random mixture of air and methane gas was held to be an explosive within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 8 4 4(j)); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381 (1 ith Cir. 1981) (gasoline poured into a
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The Seventh Circuit ruled consistent with the rationale of the
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and affirmed the conviction hold-
ing that naphtha soaked newspapers when ignited by fire are an explo-
sive. This broadens the scope of federal prosecution for offenses which
previously may have been presumed as acts of arson to be prosecuted
by state authorities in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
J. Issue of "Intent" in a False-Entry Case
The court reversed and remanded a case on the issue of jury in-
structions including the "reckless disregard" instruction. In United
States v. McAnally ,275 the defendant was convicted of a false-entry of-
fense 276 where the statute provides that any "officer, director, agent or
employee of any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank
or insured bank" who "makes any false entry in any book, report, or
statement of such bank with intent to injure or defraud" the bank shall
be guilty of a felony. On appeal the court said the jury was not cor-
rectly instructed on a crucial element of the false-entry offense, namely
intent to injure or defraud. The government tendered, and the court
gave, the following instruction: "A reckless disregard by a bank official
of his bank's interest is sufficient to establish the requisite intent to de-
fraud." Defendant's counsel objected and the court declined to give a
clarifying instruction. The reviewing court said Congress did not in-
tend that the statute was to go so far in protecting banks and their cus-
tomers from the misconduct of bank employees. The court held that
the false-entry offense is one of intent and not of carelessness. The first
element of the Section 1005 offense is simply the making of a false
entry, a very common and relatively innocuous act. The court said if
doing it with gross negligence completed the crime, the net of criminal
liability would be cast farther than Congress intended. The court be-
lieved the question of defendant's guilt was close enough to make the
error in the instruction seriously prejudicial to him. McAnaly was not
shown to have personally benefited from the false entries.277 The court
said the defendant was entitled to an instruction that unequivocally,
without confusing reference to recklessness, required that the jury,
closed room through a chimney was held to be an explosive within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i)); United States v. Birchfield, 486 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Tenn. 1980) (§ 844(i) does not apply
to a case in which a flaming piece of paper is thrown into a building which had been soaked with
gasoline).
275. 666 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir. 1981).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1976).
277. See United States v. Snow, 670 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Krepps, 605
F.2d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 1979).
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before it could convict him, would have to find that defendant intended
to injure or defraud the bank.
K Solicitation of Money in a Comprehensive Employment and
Training Program Act /CETA/
In United States v. Mosley,278 the appellant was employed by the
State of Illinois, which was acting as the prime sponsor for the federally
funded Comprehensive Employment and Training Programs Act
(CETA). In his position, defendant solicited applicants for CETA jobs
to pay him money for preferential treatment. The costs for the CETA
program, as well as the appellant's salary, was paid for entirely by the
federal government. The appellant appealed his conviction for solicit-
ing money through threats and receiving money in exchange for giving
preferential treatment to certain individuals seeking jobs.279 Mosley's
primary issue on appeal was his claim he was not a 'public official" as
that term is defined in the statute, relying upon the Second Circuit's
rulings.280 The Second Circuit ruled that employees of the City of New
York were not "public officials" in their employment under the federal
government "Model Cities" programs. Because the city employees
were entirely under state supervision and authority pursuant to the
Model Cities program, the Second Circuit held that they were not
"public officials" subject to federal prosecution under the federal en-
forcement statute.281 The Seventh Circuit disagreed in comparing the
Model Cities program with CETA as urged by appellant. The court
affirmed the conviction believing the federal government involvement
in the CETA program was sufficient to warrant considering Mosley a
"public official" acting for or on behalf of the United States. By this
action the court overruled the Northern District of Illinois case of
United States v. Hoskins.282
VI. PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A. Fifth Amendment Issues
1. Constitutional Right to Testify Unaffected by the "'Alibi Statute"
A conflict between the Seventh and Tenth Circuits was created by
278. 659 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1981).
279. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(g), 665(b) (1976).
280. United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Del Toro, 513
F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1976).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976).
282. 520 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. I11. 1981).
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the court's decision in Alicea v. Gagnon ,283 holding that a criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf under the
fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments.
The defendant's principal argument was a constitutional challenge
to the state trial court's application of Wisconsin's notice-of-alibi stat-
ute.284 Alicea claimed that the trial court violated his constitutional
right to testify and to present a defense when it excluded his alibi testi-
mony simply because he failed to notify the prosecution that he in-
tended to raise such a defense.
The court examined the Seventh Circuit cases which raised ques-
tions concerning similar statutes enacted by the states of Illinois, Wis-
consin and Indiana.285 But neither the Seventh Circuit decisions nor
those of the Supreme Court had resolved the precise issue raised by
Alicea regarding the constitutionality of applying an exclusion sanction
against the testimony of the defendant himself for failure to provide
proper alibi notice. 2
86
The court's research showed the Supreme Court had never ex-
pressly held that a defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional
right to testify in his own behalf. The absence of Supreme Court prece-
dent directly on point appeared surprising to the Seventh Circuit. His-
torically, the court said, a criminal defendant was incompetent to
testify in his own behalf. Since this common law incompetency has
been abrogated by federal and state statutes in every jurisdiction in the
United States 287 the defendant's right to testify has rarely been
questioned.
In the opinion, the court reviewed many of the Supreme Court
cases which suggested the defendant had the privilege of testifying in
his own defense or to refuse to do so. The court said although cast in
terms of a "privilege," it appears clearly that the constitutional under-
pinnings for this privilege are contained within the Supreme Court
opinions within the past twelve years. 288 The lower federal courts have
couched the right to testify in constitutional terms while the Ninth Cir-
283. 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
284. WIs. STAT. § 971.23(8) (1977).
285. See Bruce v. Duckworth, 659 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955 (1982)
(Indiana); Allison v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979) (Wisconsin); United States ex rel. Hair-
ston v. Warden, 597 F.2d 604 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) (Illinois).
286. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83
n.14 (1970); Allison v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633, 634 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979).
287. The federal statute governing this point is 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976). Pertinent state laws
are collected in Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant's Right
to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 541-542 (1976).
288. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 237 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438
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cuit has yet to decide whether the right to testify is of constitutional
magnitude, characterizing the opportunity to testify as both a right and
a privilege.
289
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction since he had man-
aged to introduce his alibi testimony despite the trial judge's preclusive
ruling. This, combined with overwhelming evidence the defendant was
guilty of armed robbery, allowed the court to conclude that the trial
court error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court said
the rule of the Tenth Circuit was in conflict with the new Seventh Cir-
cuit position.290 The court said the Tenth Circuit's sole explanation for
conditioning a defendant right to present a defense upon notice was
that such alibi-notice laws generally had been upheld in the past.
29'
The new rule now mandates that a defendant has a constitutional right
to testify in his own defense which cannot be affected by his failure to
provide notice to the court or prosecutor.
2. Commenting on Defendant's Silence
In a state conviction raising the issue of the prosecutor's attempt to
impeach the defendant's testimony by his prior silence the court, in
United States ex rel Allen v. Franzen,292 relied upon Doyle v. Ohio2 9
3
and distinguished Jenkins v. Anderson294 in affirming the district court's
granting the writ of haebas corpus. During trial, the prosecutor en-
deavored to show the jury the defendant never notified the police of the
purported self-defense theory of the case. Over objection, the prosecu-
tor persisted in framing questions to the defendant on this issue of not
having informed the police of any self-defense overtones to the killing
of his wife. Having succeeded at trial with this disclosure, the prosecu-
tor continued this attack during closing argument.
In Allen the reviewing court agreed with the district court that the
prosecutor's questions during the cross examination and remarks in
closing arguments violated petitioner's due process rights. The peti-
tioner's silence, the court said, during police confrontation on the issue
of self-defense was not necessarily inconsistent with his claim of self-
U.S. 41, 54-55 (1978); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605 (1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
289. United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980);
Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1955), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
290. Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966).
291. Id
292. 659 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1975 (1982).
293. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
294. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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defense at trial.295
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to
reconsider the granting of a writ of habeas corpus in light of Jenkins v.
Anderson.296 The district court, in granting the writ, ruled that a prose-
cutor's attempt to impeach petitioner by his post-arrest silence
amounted to a violation of the right to fundamental fairness guaran-
teed by the due process clause. 297 In the state trial for robbery, the
prosecutor commented in closing argument about the failure of peti-
tioner and his witness to come forward with his alibi prior to trial. On
remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit requested the
parties to submit additional briefs pursuant to the Seventh Circuit Rule
19. In United States ex rel. Smith v. Franzen,298 the court ruled that
Doyle v. Ohio controls this case and distinguished Jenkins which did
not consider the question of post-arrest silence and therefore was not
analogous to the instant case. The decision in Doyle dealt with the
impeachment by silence at the time of arrest, just after Miranda
299
warnings were given and while the arrestee was in custody. The court
said in Smith that the decision in Doyle did not consider the question
whether the prosecutor's reference to petitioner's failure to tell the ex-
culpatory story at any time prior to trial was unconstitutional. Doyle,
the court said, left open the very question presented in the instant case.
In a case of first impression, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Smith
that the right to remain silent operates from the time of interrogation or
arrest through the trial, absent a valid waiver. The court applied the
reasoning in Doyle and ruled that the prosecutor's comments in closing
argument, about the failure of petitioner and his witness to come for-
ward with his alibi prior to trial, violated petitioner's due process rights.
3. Introduction of Confession
In United States ex rel Gorham v. Franzen,3°° Gorham filed a suc-
cessful habeas corpus petition in the district court alleging that his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated by
the introduction of a confession in his state trial. In the earlier state
295. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (in most circumstances, silence is so
ambiguous that it is of little probative force).
296. 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (the use of pre-arrest silence did not violate either the right to remain
silent or due process).
297. See United States ex. rel. Smith v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded,
449 U.S. 810 (1980).
298. 660 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2898 (1982).
299. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
300. 675 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1982).
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proceedings, 301 the crucial police activity concerning the taking of the
statement included testimony from law enforcement personnel that
Gorham when first asked if he would like to make a statement said no.
Gorham reportedly told the officer he did not want to make a formal
statement since " . . . there were plenty of people at Menard [prison]
who were there only because they did give statements . . . ." The state
presented other witnesses in the motion to suppress proceedings who
agreed that the defendant did not make a statement when first asked.
A second team of police officers approached the defendant later and a
forty-two page confession was obtained. The defendant was accused,
along with the wife of the deceased, of killing the victim.
The district court, in granting the writ and ordering another trial,
believed it was clear that Gorham had refused to relinquish his fifth
amendment right to remain silent and further interrogation should
have ceased immediately. Compounding the problem, according to the
district court, was the presentation of the victim's wife to the petitioner
during the interrogation in an effort to confront Gorham and thereby
persuade him to "abandon his immediately prior assertion of rights,"
aggravated the fifth amendment violation. The state had opposed
Gorham's district court proceedings by filing a motion for summary
judgment, which was denied.
On appeal the case was reversed and remanded to the district court
to allow the state an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. The court
opposed the state's efforts to reverse the district court and to premise
the decision on "harmless error. ' 302 The court agreed there was sub-
stantial evidence apart from the defendant's confession implicating him
in the murder. The court said perhaps the state would have had a
sounder case by not offering the confession. The court held that the
prominence of the confession at the trial makes it appropriate to re-
mand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The dissenting opinion disagreed with this course, believing the
order of the district court should be affirmed. The reasoning in the
dissenting opinion was that the record established beyond doubt that
Gorham exercised his right to remain silent and this right was not
"scrupulously honored. ' 30 3 The dissent said Miranda3 4 does not com-
pel a prisoner to convince everyone present that he will remain silent.
The dissenting opinion said the evidentiary hearing, mandated by the
301. People v. Gorham, 66 Ill. App. 3d 320, 384 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1978).
302. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
303. See Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
304. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
majority, which was not requested by the prosecution, will not make
the case any clearer since the defendant's statements were taken in vio-
lation of Miranda.
305
In United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen,3°6 a juvenile was interro-
gated by police and he requested to speak to his father. The father was
at the police station. However, the police did not allow father and son
to communicate. Two hours later, his request denied, appellant con-
fessed to the homicides charged. In the state court proceedings and
again in the writ of habeas corpus, appellant maintained that he
wanted his father to obtain an attorney. During the interrogation pro-
cess with the police Riley did not indicate why he wanted to see his
father.
On appeal of the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, Riley as-
serted that by requesting to speak with his father during the interroga-
tion he invoked his rights to silence and to the assistance of counsel, as
delineated in Miranda v. Arizona .307 Riley said that in failing to honor
his request the police violated those rights.
The reviewing court disagreed, finding that nothing in the circum-
stances of the case warrants construing Riley's request for his father as
an invocation of his right to silence. In addition, the court said Riley's
request for his father did not constitute a request for an attorney nor
the functional equivalent of a request for counsel. The court ruled that
Riley's father was not trained in the law and consequently, was not in a
position to advise his son as to his legal rights.30 8 In addition, the State
of Illinois does not recognize a parent-child privilege so any remarks
made by Riley to his father would not be privileged.
The court believed that because of the special problems associated
with uncounseled confessions by juveniles3°9 it would probably be a
desirable matter of policy for police to consent to a juvenile suspect's
request for his parents or guardian during an interrogation. However,
the court's ruling in affirming the denial of the writ as to this appellant
will not likely make for compelling reasons to adopt such a philosophy
in police rules and regulations.
305. Id at 473-474 states in pertinent part:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown
that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statements taken after the
person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion. ...
306. 653 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1067 (1981).
307. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
308. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
309. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
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In a state prosecution for the killing of his wife the jury was al-
lowed to hear a tape recorded conversation in which the defendant ad-
vised the police he desired to talk to a lawyer before proceeding further
with responding to police questions. At trial the defense theory was
insanity and a conviction followed. In Jacks v. Duckworth,3 10 appellant
claimed the denial of his writ of habeas corpus was error; that his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel were violated when the jury was permitted to
hear, over his objection, the following single statement to the police:
"As regards what happened this evening, I want to talk to my attor-
ney." The court ruled that his right to counsel had not attached during
the police colloquy because no adversary judicial proceedings had been
initiated.3"! The introduction of the above statement of the defendant
expressing his desire to talk to his lawyer was not reversible error in the
opinion of the majority. The dissent believed allowing the jury to hear
the defendant making a request to see an attorney is extremely prejudi-
cial in a case involving, as here, an insanity defense.
312
4. Double Jeopardy Issues
United States ex re. Stevens v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee
County3 13 was a bold attempt by a defendant in a state criminal case to
present circumstances which, hopefully, through federal habeas corpus
proceedings, would result in an injunction against his forthcoming state
criminal trial. The petition alleged violation of double jeopardy. Ste-
vens was charged in a Wisconsin state court with four counts of violat-
ing a state narcotics statute. He entered a plea of guilty on two of the
counts which charged him with misdemeanors. In addition, he moved
to dismiss the other two felony counts on the ground that they charged
the same offense, so that a trial on them would place him in double
jeopardy. The trial court denied his motion as did the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Having thus exhausted his pretrial remedies in the
state court system, Stevens filed a petition for habeas corpus in the fed-
eral district court which denied the petition on the merits.
Since Stevens was on bail the threshold issue was resolved when
the court ruled he was technically "in custody" within the meaning of
the habeas corpus statute because the terms of his bond limit his free-
310. 651 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1981).
311. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-227 (1977).
312. 651 F.2d at 493-94; see United States v. Matos, 444 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1971).
313, 675 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1982).
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dom of action.3 14
The court was sympathetic with the effort put forth by Stevens,
acknowledging that to put a man to the time, expense, embarrassment,
and anxiety of being tried repeatedly for the same offense is a violation
of the double jeopardy clause that is not cured by acquitting him every
time. Since the relevant state remedies were exhausted and the peti-
tioner had nowhere else to turn in the state judicial system to get the
charges against him dismissed before trial, then it appeared that an in-
junction against the trial was a remedy for that restraint. The court
said that this was consistent with the traditional function of habeas
corpus to relieve against unlawful custody. The court cautioned that
such power does exist but it should be exercised sparingly, since it is a
grave matter for a federal judge to enjoin a state criminal trial.
The court reviewed the cases on this issue and found that in all but
a handful of cases in which a state criminal defendant has petitioned
for pretrial habeas corpus based on double jeopardy claims the peti-
tioner had actually been tried, rather then a plea of guilty as in Steven's
case.315 The court found only four appellate cases in which there was
no previous trial, the defendant having pled guilty. 31 6
The court decided this fact situation requires a balancing of inter-
ests. Since to try Stevens for the same offense to which he pled guilty
would in fact violate the double jeopardy clause it would not flount the
policy of avoiding multiple trials, since he was never tried the first time
but entered a plea of guilty. The court cited United States v. Wi/son , 3 1 7
for the principle that avoiding multiple trials is the only objective of the
double jeopardy clause that cannot be adequately protected by appeal
from [or collateral attack on] a judgment of conviction in the second
prosecution. Although the right of a criminal defendant to complain
about being put in double jeopardy is not affected by the fact that there
was no trial the first time, the issue in the instant case was not "rights"
but remedies.
The court reasoned the resolution of this case requires a compari-
son of inconveniences to the defendant and the state. Following the
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
315. See, e.g., Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1979).
316. Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 966 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981);
Hawk v. Berkemer, 610 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States ex rel. Betts v. County Ct. for La Crosse County, 496 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1974);
Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 896 (1976).
317. 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
CRIMINAL L.4W AND PROCEDURE
dictates of Younger v. Harris,31 8 the Seventh Circuit felt the Younger
policy is the weightier when the defendant is not being asked to un-
dergo a second trial. Since the petitioner was facing his first trial the
court rejected his double jeopardy argument and dismissed his petition
for habeas corpus relief.
A double jeopardy issue developed in Wilson v. Meyer,319 when
the state conviction was presented to a federal district court in a writ of
habeas corpus petition stating the defendant was again prosecuted for
felony murder after the state had secured its initial conviction for fel-
ony murder, and intent to murder. Prior to sentencing in the initial
conviction, the prosecutor's motion to nolleprosequi the felony murder
was granted, leaving only the intent to murder conviction. Following
his sentence in the state court the defendant filed a writ of habeas
corpus. Upon appeal, after the district court denied the relief, the Sev-
enth Circuit found the state had knowingly used perjured testimony,
and therefore remanded the proceeding for retrial.
32°
The state promptly tried him again, but instead of charging the
defendant with intent to murder, the charge was felony murder, the
offense the state had nolle prosequi in the initial conviction. A convic-
tion followed and this time in a writ of habeas corpus the defendant
argued double jeopardy. The Seventh Circuit agreed and reversed the
conviction and remanded the proceeding for retrial within a reasonable
time. The opinion noted that the intent to murder count continues to
be viable, having remained so through the Seventh Circuit's reversal in
1976.
The court noted its disagreement with the conclusion of the Illinois
court that no double jeopardy violation existed because the two ver-
dicts on the two counts of intent to murder and felony murder, in effect
merged into a single judgment of murder. 32' The court said this ig-
nores what actually occurred. Wilson was indicted on two theories of
murder under two counts and was adjudged guilty on each. Only then
did the State nolleprosequi the felony murder count. All that remained
was the intent to murder count. The court ruled that it could not be
318. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (which construed 28 U.S.C. § 2283 of the federal habeas corpus legis-
lation and held federal courts do not lightly enjoin state criminal proceedings).
319. 665 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 933 (1982).
320. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Warden Cannon, Stateville Penitentiary, 538 F.2d
1272 (7th Cir. 1976).
321. People v. Wilson, 61 111. App. 3d 1029, 378 N.E.2d 378 (5th Dist. 1978). See generally
United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 681 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2944 (1982); United
States ex rel. Fulton v. Franzen, 659 F.2d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1975
(1982).
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said that the two verdicts merged into a single judgment, as only one
verdict remained, with nothing whatsoever to merge with.
5. Stone v. Powell [Which Restricts Habeas Corpus Review of Some
Fourth Amendment Issues] Will not be Extended to
Miranda v. Arizona Issues
Following remand by the Supreme Court, the case of White v.
Finkbeiner3 22 was again before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court declared the defendant's continuing request for
counsel was not honored by the police and the persistent interrogation
by the police, not initiated by the defendant, was perhaps in violation
of Edwards v. Arizona.323 On remand the Seventh Circuit agreed and
was now faced with the issue of whether to extend the rationale of
Stone v. Powel 324 to bar the appellant from obtaining federal habeas
relief on the basis of a Miranda325 claim which White had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in the state court proceedings.
On its face, the holding in Stone326 applies only to claims based
upon Mapp v. Ohio .327 The Supreme Court has not yet explored the
implications of extending Stone to Miranda claims. The court in the
instant litigation said federal habeas review as to fourth amendment
issues now being limited has resulted in state courts to be less likely to
follow fourth amendment decisions of their respective federal circuits,
causing increasing inconsistencies to develop in the "Fourth Amend-
ment law." The court believed the Supreme Court would eventually
harmonize the inconsistencies which do arise by granting certiorari in
more cases raising fourth amendment claims on direct review. The
Seventh Circuit did not want to extend Stone for various reasons, in-
cluding their belief that unlike Mapp, Miranda has beneficial effects in
providing police with concrete guidelines which promote self-regula-
tion and reasonably ensure the admissibility of confessions when its
dictates are followed. The court said it doubted if it had the power for
extending Stone to Miranda claims and that the Supreme Court itself
should decide initially whether to so extend Stone. The court reversed
322. 687 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1982).
323. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
324. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
325. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
326. 428 U.S. at 494 (where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial).
327. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the writ
unless White is retried by the state within ninety days.
B. Sixth Amendment Issues
1. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Some of the federal circuit courts hold that the harmless error doc-
trine never applies in an ineffective assistance of counsel cases.328 The
majority reject this position. 329 The Supreme Court has not ruled on
this issue nor has the Seventh Circuit. In the Appeal of Wade v. Fran-
zen,330 the court reviewed the denial of a petition for habeas corpus in
the district court without a hearing in which the appellant raised two
issues. The first was whether Jackson v. Denno33' entitled him to a
separate hearing, outside the presence of the jury, on the voluntariness
of his confession. The second was whether he was denied the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
The reviewing court found that Wade was represented at trial by
the lawyer for the building's owner, the location of the crime, where
Wade worked as a janitor. This lawyer specialized in real estate law
and had never tried a felony case before this homicide trial. The law-
yer made various blunders, including refusing to file a motion to sup-
press the confession in spite of circumstances which should warrant a
pretrial hearing on the issue. The lawyer was afraid that attestation on
the motion to suppress required by the local court rule would be treated
as a waiver of his client's right not to be forced to incriminate himself.
It would not have been. 332 The reviewing court said this was plain er-
ror on the lawyer's part and that no conceivable tactical motive could
be attributed to his action. The court itemized various other "silly mo-
tions" made by counsel in addition to buttressing the state's case in the
cross-examination of witnesses. The court believed the conduct of
counsel raised grave doubts concerning the competence of Wade's
lawyer.
Although the Illinois Appellate Court found that Wade had not
been denied effective assistance of counsel, the Seventh Circuit stan-
dard was not applied as mandated by United States ex rel. Williams v.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 646 F.2d 1142, 1150 (6th Cir. 1981); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
329. See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. DeCoster,
624 F.2d 196, 208 and n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
330. 678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).
331. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
332. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-394 (1968).
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Twomey. 333 Instead, the Illinois reviewing court applied their standard
holding, ". . . the court will not reverse a conviction because of the
incompetency of counsel unless the representation is of such a low cali-
ber as to amount to no representation at all or reduces the court pro-
ceedings to a farce or sham. ' 334 The Seventh Circuit said the Illinois
Appellate Court hedged its bets by also stating, ". . . we would reach
the same result if the standard of legal representation by private coun-
sel was fixed at a lower point than above indicated, such as the need to
meet a minimum professional standard. ' 335 Since the Illinois court did
not explain the application of this standard to the facts of the instant
case the Seventh Circuit's response was, "[a] bare conclusion does not
invite deference."
The court reversed and remanded the case to the district court,
ruling the state was not entitled to summary judgement, and inviting
the district judge to examine the state trial record and perhaps hold an
evidentiary hearing at which Wade's lawyer could be asked to testify.
The court did not decide whether or not the harmless error doctrine as
applied by the minority or majority of the circuits would be adopted in
the Seventh Circuit. The court did say it found itself of the belief that
the minority view holding that harmless error may never be used in an
ineffective assistance of counsel case perhaps extreme. 336
In United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen,337 the petitioner raised
two issues from the district court's denial of her petition for habeas
corpus. First, that the failure of her counsel to notify the trial court
that she had attempted suicide three days before she entered a guilty
plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, that a deter-
mination of her competence to enter a guilty plea required a specific
333. 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) (the standard is "minimum
professional competence," not "farce or sham.").
334. People v. Wade, 71 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 389 N.E.2d 1230 (1979); accord People v. Murphy,
72 Ill. 2d 421, 436, 381 N.E.2d 677 (1978) (the accepted view in Illinois was that where counsel is
privately retained, counsel's conduct of the case would support reversal only if the level of repre-
sentation amounted to no representation at all or if the proceedings had been reduced to a farce or
sham.); cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1980); People v. Talley, 97 I11. App. 3d 439,
443, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1981) (the defendant must now show actual incompetence on the part of
trial counsel which results in such substantial prejudice that the outcome of the trial would likely
have been different had the defendant been more adequately represented.)
335. Wade, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 1020, 389 N.E.2d at 1236.
336. Compare United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981) (when circumstances
hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case, the defendant need not show specified
errors in the conduct of his defense in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel) with United
States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) (The showing of inexperience of a real estate
lawyer in criminal law is sufficient for finding of ineffectiveness in complicated mail fraud prose-
cution; a showing of specific errors committed by counsel is unnecessary).
337. 667 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ruling, separate from the determination that she was competent to
stand trial. In the state court, defense counsel attempted to have her
declared incompetent to stand trial. When this failed, he arranged a
plea-bargain whereby the defendant would serve the statutory mini-
mum for murder. The court said counsel's decision not to revive the
competency issue and thereby endanger the plea-bargain, when court
psychiatrists had repeatedly found that defendant's suicidal tendencies
did not render her incompetent, was a legitimate, albeit undesirable,
tactical decision, but in this case did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.
The court said the standard for determining ineffective assistance
of counsel is whether counsel's performance "meets a minimum profes-
sional standard. ' 33 This in turn, requires an examination of "the to-
tality of circumstances in the particular case." 339 Where an action can
fairly be construed as a "trial tactic," the court said they will not find
the action to constitute ineffective assistance simply because in hind-
sight it seems inadvisable.3 40 The court said the burden of proving
ineffective assistance rests with the defendant.
34'
The defendant's second claim was that the trial court erred in ac-
cepting her guilty plea without making a separate and specific determi-
nation that she was competent to plead guilty. Although the trial judge
had already adjudged defendant competent to stand trial, defendant
argued that a more stringent standard must be applied in examining a
defendant's competence to enter a guilty plea citing Ninth Circuit au-
thority34 2 wherein the court ruled that a higher level of competence was
required whenever constitutional rights are waived. The court ac-
knowledged the Ninth Circuit rule does impose a higher standard of
competence to enter a guilty plea than to stand trial.34 3 However, the
court said the First Circuit was critical of this Ninth Circuit rule.
344
The Seventh Circuit decided to adopt a rule contrary to the Ninth Cir-
cuit by holding that the degree of competence required to plead guilty
338. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 640 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991
(1981).
340. See United States ex rel. Rooney v. Housewright, 568 F.2d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 312 F.2d 161, 162 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 373 U.S. 943
(1963).
341. See United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931
(1979).
342. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
343. Id. at 214-15.
344. Allard v. Helgemoc, 572 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978).
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is the same as that required to stand trial, a standard in accord with at
least six other circuits.
345
Davis v. Franzen346 presented the question of whether a violation
of the sixth amendment occured because Davis and the co-defendant
were represented at their trial by lawyers from the same public de-
fender's office. The petition for habeas corpus relief contained no sug-
gestion that Davis's counsel "actively represented conflicting interests,"
the constitutional predicate for a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel set f6rth in Cuyler.347 The petition prepared by Davis merely sug-
gested there was a potential of a conflict of interest. The court said this
was not enough since there is always a potential conflict of interest
when co-defendants are represented by a single lawyer. In the instant
case the co-defendants' lawyer was from the same public defender's
office. The evidence against both defendants was the same; one could
not have been exculpated without exculpation of the other. The court
said this distinguishes the instant case from Ross v. Heyne 348 where the
Seventh Circuit sustained a claim that representation of co-defendants
by partners in the same law firm deprived the defendant of effective
assistance of counsel, because the co-defendants testified for the prose-
cution. This meant that the defendant could prevail only if his co-de-
fendants were disbelieved. That situation was the opposite of the
instant case and the court affirmed the denial of the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
In Dently v. Lane,349 Dently filed a petition in federal district court
for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney had a conflict of
interest and performed incompetently. The district court denied the
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court had decided two cases recently, Holloway v.
Arkansas350 and Cuyler v. Sullivan,351 which provide guidelines for re-
345. Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt,
528 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1975); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973); Wolf v. United States,
430 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2nd Cir. 1960).
346. 671 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1982).
347. 446 U.S. at 350.
348. 638 F.2d 979, 982-985 (7th Cir. 1980).
349. 665 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1981).
350. 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (counsel objected that his continued representation of the three co-
defendants was inappropriate because of inherent conflicts in their defenses. The Court held that,
in the face of a timely objection, the judge's failure to appoint separate counsel, or to ascertain that
the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel, deprived the defendants of their Sixth
Amendment rights).
351. 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (the trial court has no affirmative duty to inquire into the propriety of
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viewing claims that jointly represented defendants, as in the instant
case, were denied the effective assistance of counsel because of conflicts
of interest.
In Dently the appellant at trial advised the judge he did not want
the public defender since he had refused to cooperate with Dently. The
trial judge did not inquire further and later appointed another public
defender, without advising Dently the new counsel was also associated
with the co-defendant's counsel, a public defender. Although the ini-
tial counsel's formal representation had ceased, that same counsel con-
tinued to file papers on Dently's behalf in addition to other in-court
activities. The thrust of Dently's claim in the instant appeal was that he
and his co-defendant, despite their conflicting defenses, were jointly
represented by members of the same public defender's office. Dently
argued that such joint representation denied him his sixth amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Dently also maintained that,
even if there were no joint representation or conflict of interest, his at-
torney's performance failed to meet the minimum professional stan-
dard required by the sixth amendment.
352
The court agreed that Dently was entitled to an evidentiary hear-
ing on his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The
court said there were factual questions presented in the petitioner's writ
of habeas corpus that could be resolved only by a hearing. The court
instructed the district court to determine if there was an actual conflict
of interest, and whether the alleged conflict affected the adequacy of
the legal representation received by Dently.
In the remand order the district court was advised that apart from
the questions outlined in Holloway and Cuyler, the court also must con-
sider whether counsel's performance on behalf of Dently met the mini-
mum professional standard required to satisfy the sixth amendment.
353
2. Right to Counsel at Lineups
In a state court proceeding the investigating officer testified that he
arranged the line-up identification in order to provide probable cause
for the formal charging. The state court conviction was challenged by
multiple representation. However, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest affected the
adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief).
352. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("The criminal defendant, whether represented by his chosen counsel, or a
public agency, or a court-appointed lawyer, has the constitutional right to an advocate whose
performance meets a minimum professional standard.").
353. See Twomey, 510 F.2d at 640.
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way of a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the relief.
The opinion in Bruce v. Duckworth35 4 noted the state court transcript
did show that, in addition to the police officer's testimony, the issue of
probable cause was corroborated by the affidavit accompanying the
charging information that relied in part on the line-up evidence. In
affirming this matter the court noted, "[w]e therefore need not address
the issue of whether Kirby v. Illinois35 5 applies if police defer formal
charging in order to evade the requirement of presence of counsel.
'356
3. When Required in Pro se Petitions
In United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen ,357 the court dealt with the
continuing problem of when a district court judge should appoint coun-
sel for the applicant of apro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and
motion for the appointment of counsel. In Jones, the district court
judge summarily dismissed Jones' petition without ordering a response
from the state and reviewing only the submissions of the petitioner.
The court said that although it is undisputed that the findings of
state courts are presumed correct on habeas corpus review, 358 a peti-
tioner who should assert that he was denied his due process rights be-
cause the state convicted him through creation of false evidence and
suppression of truthful evidence. If that allegation be proven true and
material, the use of perjured testimony would alone entitle Jones to the
issuance of the writ..
3 59
The court noted that one of the glaring deficiencies in the case was
the decision of the district court not to order a response from the
named respondents. As a result, the district court and the reviewing
court were denied an opportunity to review such parts of the trial rec-
ord as the answering party would deem relevant. The court noted that
had this been done on such review, it may well be found that Jones'
petition is indeed frivolous. However, the court noted a continuing line
of Seventh Circuit cases in which it had stated "where a prisoner's
habeas petition is dismissed without requiring the respondent to an-
swer, the allegations must be deemed true for the present purposes. "360
Jones made additional allegations respecting withheld evidence, the
354. 659 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1981).
355. 406 U.S. 682 (1971).
356. 659 F.2d at 783.
357. 676 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
358. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 529, 457-550 (1981); White v. Finkbeiner,
570 F.2d 194, 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
359. Gigho v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
360. United States ex rel. Curtis v. Illinois, 521 F.2d 717, 721 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S.
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admission of co-defendant's statements, and improper jury
sequestration.
The court on review reversed the summary dismissal of the peti-
tion for habeas corpus and remanded the matter to the district court
with directions to appoint counsel for petitioner, to order a response
from the state respondents, to review all relevant portions of the state
trial record, and, if deemed necessary to conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing. As guidance to district court judges the court noted that when, as
here, the petition cannot be said to be frivolousper se, a failure to de-
termine all record portions relevant to the issues raised by the petition
should not be charged against an indigent prisoner when the district
court has denied a request for the appointment of counsel.
36'
In a concurring opinion, Congress was urged to reexamine the
habeas statute; specifically, that it should consider amending it to pro-
vide that federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings may not reexam-
ine state-court factfindings based, as in the present case, on a full and
fair evidentiary hearing. 362 Whether this sentiment is pervasive in the
Seventh Circuit is not apparent from other opinions but was expressed
by one of the newest members on the Seventh Circuit, who applauded
the recent Supreme Court opinions363 which reflect a much greater re-
ceptivity to the arguments against an expansive right of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners than the Townsend v. Sain364 decision did.
4. Introduction of Out-of-Court Statements, Hearsay, and Preliminary
Hearing Testimony at Trial
A state court murder conviction was reviewed by way of federal
habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition, holding that the
state's introduction of the complaining witness' preliminary hearing
testimony into evidence deprived defendant of his right to confront the
witnesses against him as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Since the complaining witness had died from causes un-
related to the proceedings, a retrial of the defendant was probably an
unlikely occurrence. On appeal in United States ex rel Haywood v.
1023 (1975); Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1969), later appeal aff'd sub non.,
Wilson v. Lash, 457 F.2d 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972).
361. 676 F.2d at 266 n.8.
362. 676 F.2d at 267 (Posner, J., concurring). See generally Macin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885
(7th Cir. 1981).
363. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 549 (1981); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977): Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
364. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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W0ff, 3 65 the court reversed the district court. The court applied the
test adopted in Ohio v. Roberts,366 a case also involving the introduc-
tion of the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness.
The Supreme Court described a two-step approach to be used in mak-
ing a determination of the admissibility of such preliminary hearing
transcripts. The first was the rule of necessity whereby the prosecution
must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant. The second aspect countenances
the use of such hearsay only if the prior testimony has trustworthiness.
In this instant case the district court found that counsel was not
afforded an adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness at the
preliminary hearing. Because of the limited scope of preliminary hear-
ings under Illinois law, 36 7 and the presiding judge's strict application of
that law in this case, the district court concluded that petitioner was
prevented from adequately testing the witness' recollection and sifting
his conscience to satisfy the demands of the confrontation clause. The
court of appeals said the district court erred in this determination.
The district court reasoned that the introduction of the witness'
preliminary hearing testimony violated petitioner's confrontation rights
since it was clear counsel was prohibited from asking the witness his
present address, an issue the Supreme Court has found is violative of
the accused's constitutional right of cross examination. 368 Similarly,
application of state rules of evidence which prevented a defendant
from cross examining a witness as to prior inconsistent statements was
held to be a denial of due process. 369 Related restrictions on the peti-
tioner's right of cross examination occurred at the preliminary hearing
in the instant case. The court of appeals said this reasoning by the
district court was a misunderstanding of the law.
The court of appeals said the Supreme Court holdings have never
required that the opportunity for cross examination afforded at the pre-
liminary hearing must be identical with that required at trial. Al-
though the Supreme Court has found that there was in fact full and
complete cross examination at the preliminary hearing in those cases in
365. 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981).
366. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
367. United States ex rel. Bonner v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 915 (1971) (the general purposes of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether the crime
charged has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that it was
committed by the accused).
368. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
369. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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which it has upheld the admission of such evidence at trial,370 it has
never said that either the opportunity to cross examine, or the actual
cross examination conducted at the preliminary hearing, must be as full
and complete as allowed at trial in order for testimony from such a
proceeding to be admissible in the event the witness subsequently be-
comes unavailable. Pointer v. Texas37' is the only occasion the
Supreme Court has found confrontation at the preliminary hearing
constitutionally insufficient to permit the previous testimony of an un-
available witness to be used at trial. In that case the accused had been
without counsel at the time of the hearing and had made no attempt to
cross examine the witness on his own. The court of appeals felt that
perhaps the significant element in Pointer, though not mentioned in the
Supreme Court opinion, was the fact that the witness whose prelimi-
nary hearing testimony was introduced had simply moved to another
state. In the instant case the need for the prior testimony was much
greater since the witness had not merely changed his place of living,
but had ceased living altogether.
The court set forth the test for determining whether preliminary
hearing testimony is admissible under the confrontation clause. The
court said, as with all hearsay, it is not whether there was an opportu-
nity for full and complete cross examination, but whether there are ad-
equate indicia of reliability to justify its placement before the jury, even
though there is no contemporaneous confrontation of the declarant.
372
The dissent was critical of the majority's conclusion that the wit-
ness' statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability to be introduced at
trial without any cross examination. The dissent said that since the
government's entire case rested upon this witness' testimony, there were
certain indicia of unreliability which the majority failed to consider,
including the critical issues that indicate the witness' preliminary hear-
ing testimony was too unreliable to be admitted without any cross ex-
amination. One indicia of unreliability was the fact that three other
men whom the witness identified as co-perpetrators, with the defend-
ant, of the murders were not convicted of the crimes. One was acquit-
ted, and the two others were not prosecuted because police
investigation showed that they were not involved in the crimes. Even
though the witness testified that three men committed the murders, he
370. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
371. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
372. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980): see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 686-687 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct.
2944 (1982).
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had identified four different men. Evidence existed that the witness
was under the influence of narcotics at the time of the crime. However,
at the preliminary hearing, counsel was not permitted to question the
witness on his physical condition. For these and similar reasons the
dissent did not feel the majority was correct in finding the existence of
indicia of reliability.
Since the defendant did not have the opportunity to expose false-
hood in front of the trier of fact, especially in light of the witness' un-
questionably poor past record of veracity, and his intoxication from
heroin on the evening of the crime, the dissenting judge found it grossly
unfair for the defendant to be convicted solely on this preliminary
hearing transcript.
A witness to an extortion setting appeared before a grand jury and
testified under oath. During the trial of the Hobbs Act 373 proceedings
this witness, Chiampas, was subpoenaed to appear and did appear, but
refused to answer any questions though ordered twice to do so by the
judge. He explained that he was afraid for his life. He was then ex-
cused and the government offered in evidence his grand jury transcript.
The district court admitted it, and it was read to the jury. Chiampas'
testimony was later corroborated at every point by the tape of the con-
versation recorded describing the fight and appellants involvement
with the victim of the extortion threat. Other points of his grand jury
transcript were corroborated by the testimony of eyewitnesses to the
event. A conviction followed. In United States v. Boulahanis,374 the
appellants argued that the admission of the grand jury transcript into
evidence violated both the Federal Rules of Evidence3 75 and the sixth
amendment since a transcript cannot be cross-examined. The court
disagreed, saying it would have been needless cruelty for the court to
have put Chiampas to a choice between going to jail and running the
risk of being killed, so there was no reason for the district court to
threaten him with contempt. The introduction of the grand jury tran-
script, in the opinion of the court, complied with the requirements of
Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, since all that is required is
that the hearsay evidence is the most probative evidence reasonably
available on a material issue in the case.
3 76
In this case it was material though not essential for the government
to show that the appellants had beaten up the victim the night before,
373. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
374. 677 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
375. FED. R. EvID. 804.
376. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354-1355 (8th Cir. 1976).
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as witnessed by Chiampas prior to the taped conversation; it was fur-
ther evidence that the transaction discussed in the taped conversation
was extortionate and not, as the appellants tried to show at the trial, a
normal business transaction. At the time that Chiampas' grand jury
testimony was read into evidence the government had no other direct
evidence that it was the appellants who were involved in beating up the
victim.
In addition, the court concluded that the introduction of the grand
jury transcript did not violate the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment. The fact that Chiampas was not available for cross exam-
ination did not violate the sixth amendment. The Seventh Circuit said
it believes the "influential" plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans377 has
convinced this Circuit it is ". . . unwilling to hold that the admission of
hearsay evidence is a per se violation of the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment." In the instant litigation the court reasoned that the
grand jury transcript was admissible, since it was accurately reported
and the accuracy was not challenged; that Chiampas' statement was
made voluntarily and under oath at the grand jury proceedings and
was corroborated at the trial by other highly probative evidence, in-
cluding tape recording and eyewitness accounts.
In Davis v. Franzen,378 the petitioner complained that his sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was denied by
the admission in evidence of the statement by a witness named Tensley
who said Davis' companion in a robbery/murder had remarked follow-
ing the stickup, "I sure liked the way you popped that dude." Tensley
was the driver of the get-a-way vehicle. The court said the evidence at
trial was sufficient to show Davis and his companion acted in concert in
the robbery and that this foundation was all that was necessary to make
the companion's statement admissible against Davis.
The court ruled that the admission of evidence in violation of the
hearsay rule is not a per se violation of the sixth amendment. 379 The
court said the Seventh Circuit follows the Dutton v. Evans380 plurality
opinion, and has extracted from Dutton the proposition that the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence does not violate the constitutional right of
confrontation if the witness offering the hearsay testimony is cross ex-
377. 400 U.S. 74 (1970); accord, United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2959 (1982).
378. 671 F.2d 1056 (1982).
379. See United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 832 n.5 (7th Cir. 1973).
380. 400 U.S. 74 (1970); United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 1981); Cogwell,
486 F.2d at 834.
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amined and "the circumstances under which the statement was made
indicated the content of the statement was true."' 38'
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state
criminal defendant is entitled to be confronted by opposing witnesses
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 382 For reasons not apparent
from the record, in a state trial for murder, the prosecutor was permit-
ted to admit into evidence, and to read from, transcripts of the six pros-
ecution witnesses' out-of-court statements. Before each transcript was
admitted the declarant examined it and verified its accuracy. Three
kinds of challenged statements were admitted into evidence: grand
jury testimony; statements to police investigators given shortly after the
crime; and a statement to the coroner. Except for the coroner's state-
ment, the challenged statements were in question and answer format.
In Flawallen v. Faulkner383 the court reviewed the denial of a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus raising one ground for relief: that, at
his trial the petitioner was denied the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . ." as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
Specifically, the challenge was to the admission into evidence in the
state prosecution, over objections, of six prosecution witnesses' out-of-
court statements as part of the state's case-in-chief. All agreed on ap-
peal that defendant was not present when the out-of-court declarations
were made and that, neither personally nor through counsel, did de-
fendant have a contemporaneous opportunity to cross examine the de-
clarants. However, defendant fully cross examined all six of the
declarants at trial.
The court affirmed, citing California v. Green384 and saying that
although the need for the use of the recalcitrant witness' prior testi-
mony clearly was present in Green, in terms of accuracy and reliability
the instant case is not materially different. The court said the defend-
ant's ability to cross examine the declarants in the instant case was
probably greater than that of the defendant in Green because the wit-
nesses in the instant case neither professed uncertainty nor expressed
hostility. The court said that although necessity may have been absent,
there was no error of constitutional magnitude in the instant case. To
the extent that the sixth amendment secures the right to have the trier
of fact observe the witnesses' demeanor, the opportunity for the jury in
381. Cogwell, 486 F.2d at 834.
382. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation).
383. 677 F.2d 610 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 214 (1982).
384. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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the instant case to do so during cross examination was considered suffi-
cient. The court said that although a greater opportunity to observe
demeanor may have been preferable, its absence does not render de-
fendant's conviction constitutionally infirm. The court noted in conclu-
sion that it did not condone or encourage the use of the procedure
challenged in this case, but in the absence of any demonstrated or ap-
parent prejudice to defendant occasioned by its use, his sixth amend-
ment rights were not abridged.
This holding may encourage state and federal prosecutors to en-
hance the credibility of its witnesses by first funneling them through the
police format of question and answer responses prior to trial.
C Matters Involving the Jury
1. Failure to Provide the Not Guilty Verdict Form
The failure to include a not guilty verdict form in a state prosecu-
tion resulted in the overturning of a murder conviction. In United
States ex rel. Ross v. Franzen,385 the court divided on the issue where
the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the district court
alleging that the state trial court had abridged his constitutional rights
by refusing to include a plain "not guilty" form among the verdict
forms given to the jury. The district court dismissed the petition. The
court on appeal remanded the case with directions to order the release
of the petitioner unless he is again brought to trial within 90 days.
In the trial court, defense counsel said he wanted the not guilty
verdict form included with the other three verdict forms which in-
cluded guilty; not guilty by reason of insanity and in need of further
mental treatment; and not guilty by reason of insanity and not in need
of further mental treatment. 386 The court noted at the outset that peti-
tioner's failure to make a more formal objection to the alleged error at
trial does not bar the federal court from now addressing that issue,
since the state appellate court decided the merits of petitioner's consti-
tutional claim notwithstanding the lack of preservation.
387
The court concluded that the state appellate court's determination
that petitioner never questioned at trial the doing of the criminal acts
was without support in the record, and provided examples of the record
data supporting a challenge to the state's case. The court cited Braley v.
385. 668 F.2d 933 (1982).
386. People v. Ross, 63 I11. App. 3d 884, 380 N.E.2d 897 (1978).
387. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 161-162
(1978) (ruling by state's highest court left question open to federal review).
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Gladden,388 where the Ninth Circuit remanded for a new trial when
there was merely an inadvertent failure to submit the not guilty form to
the jury. The Braley court had reasoned the oversight in not furnishing
the not guilty verdict form along with the opposite form constituted, in
effect, a severly adverse comment by the trial judge, an impermissibly
grave insinuation of judicial attitude toward the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence. 389 The court noted it has long been the law of the Sev-
enth Circuit that counsel may not stipulate to facts establishing the
guilt of the accused without the defendant's consent. 390
In reversing the conviction the court noted that the waiver of a
constitutional right must be "an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right."'391 The court said the facts of the instant
appeal did not establish a waiver of the petitioner's right to a jury deci-
sion as to whether he committed the crime. Consequently, the court
held it was error for the trial court to submit only the three verdict
forms to the jury, since that action, together with its instruction to
choose among the three forms, effectively foreclosed any realistic possi-
bility of a not guilty verdict.
2. Asking Jurors Their Numerical Division is not Violative of the
Constitution
In an appeal from the denial of a state prisoner's petition for
habeas corpus, the court in United States ex rel Kirk v. Director, Dept.
of Corrections,392 was called upon to decide whether the rule forbid-
ding trial judges from inquiring as to the jury's numerical division,
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brasfield v. United States,393 is
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether
it is merely an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction
over federal courts.
In the state court proceedings the reviewing court agreed the trial
judge committed error but held it was not reversible error and affirmed
the conviction. 394 The Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
388. 403 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1968).
389. 403 F.2d at 860.
390. See Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 993-994 (7th Cir. 1941).
391. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
392. 678 F.2d 723 (1982).
393. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
394. People v. Kirk, 76 Ill. App. 3d 459, 394 N.E.2d 1212 (1979), cert. denied, sub. nom, Kirk
v. Illinois, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
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Fourth and Eighth Circuits395 holding that the rule of Brafield is based
not on the Constitution but on the Supreme Court's supervisory juris-
diction over federal courts. As such, it is not binding on the states, and
the state trial judge's failure to follow that rule in the instant case does
not by itself entitle petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief. The court
left open the possibility there may well be cases where a review of the
entire record leaves one with the overwhelming impression that the
trial judge's inquiry as to the jury's numerical division pending deliber-
ations would entitle a defendant to relief. Inasmuch as the petitioner in
the instant case did not make an attempt to show actual coercion, com-
bined with the fact that the verdict was not obtained until some eight-
een hours after the challenged inquiry, the court said no constitutional
error occurred.
3. Presumption Language not Endorsed in the Instructions When
Intent is an Element of the Crime
In the appeal of the denial of federal habeas corpus relief the court
in Pigee v. Israe1396 was split on the question of a jury instruction. In
this case intent was an element of the crime charged. The jury instruc-
tion read: "When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the
presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all the
natural probable and usual consequences of his deliberate act". The
issue raised was whether the giving of this instruction risks a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's requirement that a state prove every
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.397
The appellant contended that the instruction could have been in-
terpreted by the jury to require the appellant to prove he lacked intent
to kill, thus shifting the burden of persuasion to him on the element of
intent. If this was true it would violate the due process principle that
the burden is on the state to prove every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.398 The majority felt a reasonable jury
could not have interpreted the instruction in an unconstitutional man-
ner and affirmed the denial of the petition by the district court. Before
reaching this conclusion, the court had the following advice for trial
judges:
395. Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Ellis v.
Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
396. 670 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 103 (1982).
397. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 485
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1981).
398. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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Trial judges, both state and federal, would be wise in the future
to avoid 'presumption' language in this area, in favor of language
pointing out inferences which can permissibly be drawn from con-
duct and emphasis on the prosecution's burden at all times to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
399
The dissenting opinion proposed the most rational method of dis-
posing of the case. The dissent showed how the instruction in the in-
stant case was virtually the same as the instruction condemned in
Sandstrom v. Montana .4 0 The dissenting opinion believed the major-
ity decision was in "collision" with Sandstrom and that giving the jury
instruction in this case deprived the appellant of his right to due pro-
cess of law.40 1 The fact that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was di-
vided on the question raised in this case 402 as were the appellate courts
of Wisconsin, in addition to the district court judges of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin,40 3 the dissent raised the question, "How then will
twelve lay persons, most if not all of whom are having their initial ex-
perience with the law, arrive at a unanimous and constitutionally ac-
ceptable interpretation of the instruction?" The dissenting opinion
believed there was a rational foundation to the possibility that due pro-
cess had been denied to the appellant.
4. Alternate Jurors in the Deliberation Process
In a case of first impression, Johnson v. Duckworth 404 presented the
question as to whether a state court may constitutionally require an
alternate juror to observe the jury's deliberations, over the defendant's
objection. The defendant contended that any person who is not per-
mitted to participate in the jury's discussion and vote must be consid-
ered a stranger to the deliberations, and that allowing any stranger to
observe deliberations violates the "cardinal principle" that jury deliber-
ations must be secret and private in every case. The defendant relied
on other federal circuits which held the presence of the alternate juror
399. 670 F.2d at 696.
400. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
401. 670 F.2d at 697 (Baker, J., dissenting).
402. See Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 478, 289 N.W.2d 570, 584 (1980) (Abrahamson, J.
dissenting).
403. The instruction has been held unconstitutional and in conflict with Sandstrom in Drink-
water v. Gagnon, 521 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Austin v. Israel, 516 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.
Wis. 1981); Boyer v. Israel, 515 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Harris v. Israel, 515 F. Supp. 568
(E.D. Wis. 1981).
The instruction has been held constitutional and not in conflict with Sandstrom in Hoppe v.
Israel, 516 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Shumate v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 515 F.
Supp. 723 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
404. 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981).
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during deliberations to be perse reversible error in federal criminal
trials.405
The court noted that the necessity for privacy and secrecy in jury
deliberations lies in the danger that ". . . freedom of debate might be
stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel
that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
world.",06
Since this issue was raised by a state prisoner in his petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, the court on appeal
concluded that jury privacy is not a constitutional end in itself; it is,
rather, a means of ensuring the integrity of the jury trial. Therefore,
since any jury system is composed of many discrete features which may
vary from forum to forum without running afoul of sixth amendment
guarantees, 4°7 the procedure adopted by the State of Indiana in al-
lowing alternate jurors to observe the jury's deliberations may not be
perfect, but, the court held that it cannot be said to have deprived John-
son of his constitutional right to trial by jury.
D. District Judges Authority and Obligations in Reviewing Habeas
Corpus Petitions
1. May not Issue the Writfor Violation of State Constitutional Law
In United States ex rel Hoover v. Franzen ,408 the court was faced
with a district court order granting relief to eight state prisoners who
were to be transferred to federal prisons outside Illinois. In their writ
for habeas corpus relief against both federal and state custodians they
alleged violations of their rights to due process and the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, their statutory rights under federal law,40 9 in addi-
tion to violation of the Illinois Constitution,410 which provides, "[nlo
person shall be transported out of the state for an offense committed
within the state."
The district court, in affording relief, relied on the state constitu-
405. United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Beasley, 464
F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964).
406. 650 F.2d at 124 citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
407. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (the states are not constitutionally bound to
employ twelve-member juries in serious criminal cases); Apodaca v. Oregon. 406 U.S. 404, 411
(1972) (twelve-member juries need not reach unanimous verdicts). See generally Kelsie v. Trigg,
657 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1981).
408. 669 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1982).
409. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(a), 5003 (1976); Lono v. Fenton, 581 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
410. ILL. CONST. art. I, § I1.
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tional claim asserted by petitioners, reasoning that under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction it could entertain the state constitutional claims
before reaching the federal constitutional claims. 411 The district court
had concluded that the plain language of the Illinois Constitution pro-
hibits the transfer of the petitioners to prisons outside of Illinois.
The Seventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, said the district
court erred in concluding that it had pendent jurisdiction over the state
constitutional claim alleging the provisions of the Illinois Constitution
were violated. Although the parties on appeal focused on the propriety
of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding,
the court decided the more fundamental question was whether the dis-
trict court had the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus for violation
of state law. The court said that merely because the state law claim is
in federal court does not lead to the application of federal law.4 12 The
reviewing court reversed the district court's order granting the writ,
saying it lacked jurisdiction since Congress has limited habeas relief to
violations of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States..
4 13
The court said that by granting the writ the district court ignored this
principle in issuing a writ of habeas corpus for a state law violation.
Rather than remand the case for a determination of whether a
state law remedy exists for the violation of state law and, if so, to im-
pose the state remedy as allowed under the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction 41 4 the Seventh Circuit said implicit in this litigation is the
"exhaustion doctrine" that potential habeas claims first be litigated in a
state court before recourse is had to a federal district court.415 In exam-
ining Congress' preference for initial state court litigation of federal
claims, combined with the limits of the scope of the issues cognizable in
habeas corpus proceedings, the Seventh Circuit held "we think it fair to
conclude that Congress preferred that state courts be the sole forum for
litigating state claims which might otherwise be pended to habeas
claims. ' 416 The court eliminated any thoughts that the exhaustion
principle governs the instant case.
The rationale for the court's decision was to avoid duplicate litiga-
tion, believing the economy of judicial resources achieved by trying the
underlying pendent jurisdictional claims in federal courts over state
411. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
412. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
413. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See, e.g., Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975).
414. See United Mine Workers v. Gibb, 383 U.S. 715.
415. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
416. 669 F.2d at 445.
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courts is inapplicable in habeas corpus proceedings. The mechanics of
attaching state claims to habeas corpus claims in federal court makes
no sense, in the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, since the habeas claim
first require exhaustion in state court. For these reasons the court held
that, "in general, state law claims may not be appended to federal
habeas corpus claims, and federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings
have no jurisdiction over such state law claims.
'4 17
2. The Court has Power to Issue Default Judgment Against the State
A state attorney general failed to comply with a district court order
requiring that copies of the state court transcript of petitioner's trial be
filed within twenty days. In Ruiz v. Cady,4 18 the appeal raised the ques-
tion of whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the
petitioner's writ of habeas, without a determination of the merits, since
the attorney general failed to comply with the court order.
The district court's opinion 419 related that the respondent's expla-
nation for the attorney general's office delay fell far short of demon-
strating excusable neglect, stating, "I consider this conduct to constitute
bureaucratic paralysis rather than excusable neglect. This disregard for
the court's orders and for the petitioner's right to a swift resolution of
his habeas claims poses a threat to the orderly administration of
justice."
420
The reviewing court said that it was in complete sympathy with
the district court's concern that the attorney general's staff did not live
up to its obligations in prisoner cases, and in addition agreed that the
respondent offered an inadequate explanation for the delay in this case.
However, the court felt there were several alternatives the distinct court
might have employed, rather than using the default judgment remedy,
as a more appropriate sanction:421 (1) It could have notified the attor-
ney general that in the future, requests for extension would be routinely
denied. (2) It could have shortened the normal briefing schedule and
otherwise sought a speedier determination, in order to make up to Ruiz
for the state's tardiness. (3) It could have disciplined counsel or insti-
tuted contempt proceedings against counsel for the state, the attorney
general's legal services administrator or the attorney general himself.
422
417. Id
418. 660 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1981).
419. Ruiz v. Cady, 507 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
420. Id at 52.
421. 660 F.2d at 341.
422. Id; see United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott, 570 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The court said the availability of these alternative sanctions, does
not mean, however, that there might not come a time when entry of
default would be appropriate. The court noted that a default judg-
ment, without full inquiry into the merits, is especially rare when en-
tered against a custodian in a habeas corpus proceedings. The court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings, cautioning that al-
though a default remedy is extreme, and may well conflict with the
public's right to protection, the remedy should be preserved as a sanc-
tion against a respondent's unwarranted delay. In such circumstances,
the court said a default judgment for the petitioner may then be the
necessary remedy for the respondent's delay.423
3. Delay in State Remedies Will Jusqfy District Court Hearing to
Determine f Delay is Justifiable
In Lowe v. Duckworth ,424 the district court dismissed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus for failure to exhaust state remedies. When
Lowe filed his petition in district court, his post-conviction relief mo-
tion was pending in the Indiana state court. Lowe argued to the district
court that, notwithstanding the pendency of the state court proceeding,
his federal petition should not be dismissed on exhaustion grounds be-
cause his state remedy was ineffective. 425 Lowe's state motion had lain
dormant for nearly three and one-half years despite his attempts, by
writing to the state court judge, to obtain a ruling on his motion. The
Seventh Circuit agreed with the appellant, ruling the district court's
dismissal of the petition fied by Lowe was clearly erroneous. The
court said where the state court delay is inordinate, the district court
must hold a hearing to determine whether the delay is justifiable. 426
4. Standard to Employ in Reviewing Petitions
One of the cases before the Seventh Circuit this term should serve
as a guide to lawyers filing on behalf of clients or persons filingpro se
as to the contents of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In United
423. Troglin v. Clanon, 378 F. Supp. 273, 280 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Witt v. State ex rel. Eyman,
343 F. Supp. 392, 394 (D. Ariz. 1972); cf. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 906 (1970).
424. 663 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1981).
425. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an
absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
426. 663 F.2d at 43, citing Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1970).
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States ex rel Green v. Greer,427 apro se habeas corpus petition filed in
the federal district court alleged that the evidence adduced in his state
court murder trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Nowhere
in the petition was there any challenge to the accuracy or completeness
of the facts as summarized by the state appellate court, but only
whether the conclusions drawn from those facts were permissible. The
issue before the reviewing court was whether the district court erred in
dismissing the petition without first ordering and examining the trial
record.
The court concluded that the district court need not examine the
full trial record where a habeas corpus petitioner alleges insufficiency
of evidence without identifying inaccuracies or incompleteness in the
factual summaries before the court. The court said neither case law nor
the habeas corpus statute compels such a time-consuming and superflu-
ous procedure.428 In Sumner v. Mata 429 the court emphasized that the
1966 amendment to the habeas corpus statute430 which added Section
2254(d), represented an attempt by Congress to "alleviate" the friction
between state and federal courts resulting from the ability of the federal
courts to overturn state court opinions under the habeas statute. To-
ward this end, Section 2254(d) bestows a "presumption of correctness"
upon state court fact finding. The Sumner Court held that this pre-
sumption "applies to factual determinations by state courts, whether
the court be a trial or an appellate court."
Litigants should understand this development in drafting their pe-
titions for district court review. Where a state appellate court makes a
finding of fact, this finding can only be overturned by convincing evi-
dence that the finding was erroneous. The petitioner's burden under
the Seventh Circuit rulings must ensure there are allegations sufficient
to show inaccuracies or incompleteness in the state appellate court's
findings.
5. Extradition Treaty and Statute of Limitations
While his appeal was pending, following the denial of petitioner's
writ of habeas corpus concerning an issue of extradition to Sweden, the
statute of limitations expired and the initial appeal affirmed the order
directing a Mr. Assarsson be surrendered to the Swedish authorities.43'
427. 667 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1981).
428. See Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
429. Id
430. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
431. In reAssarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
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Assarsson then filed the second petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was the subject of the appeal In the Matter of Assarsson .432 In
the district court Assarsson claimed that he could not be extradited be-
cause the condition set forth in the Extradition Treaty had not been
satisfied. 433 The district court denied the petition holding that the stay
of commitment entered at Assarsson's request, allowing him to appeal
the initial denial of the writ of habeas corpus, tolled the running of the
statute of limitations.
The Seventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, said to interpret
Article V, 2 of the Extradition Treaty as Assarsson requests would
result in an anomaly that neither the United States nor Sweden could
have intended. The procedures for conducting extradition hearings
pursuant to a treaty or convention for extradition, is statutory. 434 The
court said Assarsson was provided a hearing and the order to take As-
sarsson into custody for surrender to the Swedish authorities was
within the statutory period of the statute of limitations. The court ruled
it would not permit Assarsson to use the delay which he himself created
to defeat extradition. By permitting individuals to challenge extradi-
tion orders pursuant to petitions for writs of habeas corpus is a means
to ensure that "all persons on our soil receive due process under our
laws."'4 35 The court said that since this process, in addition to appeals,
may take years, the appellant cannot complain.
E. Exhaustion Doctrine Requires All State Issues to be Exhausted
Before Filing Federal Habeas Corpus
The Supreme Court in March 1982 decided the case of Rose v.
Lundy,436 holding that when a habeas petition contains both exhausted
and unexhausted claims, the district court must dismiss the claim in
toto. Several months earlier the Seventh Circuit decided the case of
Ware v. Gagnon,437 and adopted the rule of the majority of the federal
circuit courts holding that mixed petitions should not be dismissed in
toto; rather, the district courts should reach the merits of the exhausted
claims where the unexhausted claims are unrelated to them or are friv-
olous. Later in the term, a similar issue developed in United States ex
432. 670 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1982).
433. Art. V. 1 2 (provides in part that extradition shall not be granted in those circumstances
when barred by a statute of limitations); 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
434. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1976).
435. 635 F.2d at 1244.
436. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
437. 659 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1981).
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rel Clauser v. Shadid,4 38 and the court applied the new Supreme Court
mandate and ruled that because of the petitioner's failure to exhaust his
state remedies in regard to his incompetence of counsel claims, the dis-
trict court would be precluded from taking cognizance of his double
jeopardy claim.
F State Parole Matters
In the case of Welsh v. Mizell,439 a state prisoner in Illinois had
served his minimum sentence on a prison term of sixty to one hundred
years and was denied parole nine times. He filed apro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus contending that Illinois' statutory and regulatory
parole criteria had changed significantly between 1962, when he com-
mitted the crime, and 1973, when new legislation affecting parole stan-
dards took effect. In 1962 the emphasis had been on preventing further
crimes by the particular candidate for parole. The 1973 criteria re-
flected instead a philosophy of general deterrence-that a prisoner
should not be paroled so long as his incarceration might deter other
potential offenders.440 The application of the new parole criteria to
him, Welsh argued, contravened the ex post facto clause of the Consti-
tution of the United States.44 The district court dismissed the petition,
reasoning that the changes in parole criteria were procedural and that
procedural changes do not violate the ex post facto clause when they
operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to the petitioner's
disadvantage.
42
In Welsh v. Mizell the state urged the court to deny relief since
Welsh had not exhausted his state remedy. The court ruled this would
be a futile effort since the Illinois Appellate Court had just recently
rejected a challenge identical to Welsh's.
The court reasoned that the change in law has worked a substan-
tial harm to Welsh. At the time of his offense, exemplary conduct dur-
ing his imprisonment might well have resulted in parole. Under the
1973 enactment, no evidence of satisfactory rehabilitation can over-
438. 677 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1982).
439. 668 F.2d 328 (1982).
440. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1003-3-5(c) (1979) (the new parole criteria provide for the denial
of parole if: (1) there is substantial risk that the prisoner will not conform to reasonable condi-
tions of parole; or (2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law; or (3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on
institutional discipline).
441. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall... pass any. . . ex post facto Law."). A
similar clause applies to the federal government. Art. I, § 9 cl. 3. The Illinois Constitution con-
tains a like provision in art. 1, § 16.
442. Welsh, 668 F.2d at 329, citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925).
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come a finding that the nature of his crime makes him a socially unde-
sirable candidate for parole. The court found support in Weaver v.
Graham44 3 for its decision that the change from special deterrence cri-
teria to general deterrence criteria is substantial and that the retrospec-
tive application of the general deterrence criteria violates the ex post
facto clause. In light of Graham a prisoner does not have to show that
he had a vested right to be paroled. The court held that the constraint
on the Parole Board's discretion in Welsh's case must be those con-
tained in the statute and regulations that were in effect in 1962, not
those subsequently enacted. The court remanded the case to the Pris-
oner Review Board of Illinois for reconsideration under the relevant
guidelines, cautioning that should the Board deny parole again, it must
give its reasons in order to satisfy the due process requirements of
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates.4"
The court reversed the district court's denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in United States ex rel Scott v. Brewer,445 holding
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex 4 6 is applicable
to the instant litigation, and concluding that the Illinois parole release
statute44 7 does create a constitutional liberty interest. The court said
inmates still under the State of Illinois parole system have a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest. This being so, due process requires
at a minimum that an inmate whose request for parole is denied be
provided with a statement of reasons for the denial.
The court distinguished the instant case from the earlier Seventh
Circuit decision in A verhart v. Tutsie,448 where the court was bound by
the Indiana Supreme Court's decision holding the Indiana parole re-
lease statute created no expectancy of release and therefore no constitu-
tional liberty interest.
The court remanded the case to the district court to allow it to
determine what the practice of the Illinois parole system is as it con-
cerns granting parole to persons whose commitment offense is murder.
If the district court should find that the Board does grant parole to
persons whose commitment offense is murder, it should order the
Board to reconsider the appellant's request for parole and either grant
443. 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be
ex post faco: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enact-
ment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it).
444. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
445. 668 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1982).
446. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
447. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1979).
448. 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980).
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that request or provide him with a sufficient statement of reasons for its
denial. The court held that the Illinois statute concerning parole pro-
vides an inmate with a legitimate expectation of parole which is enti-
tled to constitutional protection. Later in the term the court ruled
Greenholtz applicable to the federal parole statute" 9 holding that a




The Seventh Circuit has confronted its large volume of criminal
appeals with a sense of the principles upon which it has decided such
cases in the past, as well as an awareness of the conflicting positions
taken by other circuits on the same issues. While maintaining its con-
servative bent, the Seventh Circuit has shown a willingness to reexam-
ine those principles. The changes that such reexaminations produce
must be continually examined if scholar and practitioner desire to un-
derstand the Seventh Circuit's positions on criminal law and
procedure.
449. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976).
450. Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982).

